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JURISDICTION 
I. THIS COURT LACKS JURISDICTION OVER PLAINTIFF'S APPEAL 
BECAUSE PLAINTIFF FAILED TO TIMELY FILE, 
As addressed in Defendants' earlier Motion for Summary Disposition to Dismiss 
Plaintiffs Appeal as Untimely, this Court lacks jurisdiction over this appeal because 
Plaintiff failed to file a notice of appeal within 30 days of the final judgment. UTAH R. 
APP. P. 3(a), 4(a) & 10(a). On June 8, 2007, the trial court entered its "Final Order" in 
this matter in which all the pending items for review were fully resolved. (R. 4433-
4436). Plaintiff was therefore required to file his appeal by July 9, 2007 or 30 days from 
the June 8, 2007 Final Order. Plaintiff did not file his appeal until August 6, 2007-59 
days after entry of the Final Order. (R. 4443-44). In a September 18, 2007 "Order," this 
Court deferred ruling on this motion until plenary presentation of the merits, but indicated 
that the parties could rest on the pleadings in reintroducing this issue in the appeal briefs. 
Defendants respectfully refer the Court to their summary disposition motion which has 
been fully briefed, including the determinative law, and request that Plaintiffs appeal be 
dismissed as untimely. 
II. THIS COURT HAS JURISDICTION OVER DEFENDANTS' APPEAL. 
Defendants appeal the denial of their attorney's fees and costs of the trial court 
(Honorable J.A. Dever of the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah ("trial or lower court")). Defendants' appeal is properly before this Court pursuant 
to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2-2(3)0), providing for Utah Supreme Court review of final 
orders from any court of record from which the Utah Court of Appeals does not have 
original appellate jurisdiction. 
DEFENDANTS9 ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW, PRESERVATION FOR 
APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
(a) Did the trial court err when it denied Defendants their attorney's fees where 
they successfully defended against Plaintiffs claims? 
This issue was preserved for appeal. (R. 4012-4175; 4184-4348; 4352-4377; 
4389; 4433-36; 4450-53). This issue is a matter of law, which is reviewed for 
correctness. Paul deGroot Bldg. Servs., L.L.C. v. Gallacher, 2005 UT 20, \ 18, 112P.3d 
490; Chase v. Scott, 2001 UT App. 404, \ 8, 38 P.3d 110. 
(b) Did the trial court err when it denied Defendants their request for costs? 
This issue was preserved for appeal. (R. 4378-88; 4390-4432; 4456-58; 4459-71). 
Normally, the standard of review for review of costs under Rule 54(d)(2) is an abuse of 
discretion standard. Young v. State, 2000 UT 91, \ 4, 16 P.3d 549. However, where a 
legal determination is made in applying this rule, as is the case here, the trial court's 
decision is reviewed for correctness. Lyon v. Burton, 2000 UT 19, \ 76, 5 P.3d 616. 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-56.5 Attorney's Fees-Reciprocal Rights to Recover 
Attorney's Fees. 
A court may award costs and attorney's fees to either party 
that prevails in a civil action based upon any promissory note, 
written contract, or other writing executed after April 28, 
1986, when the provisions of the promissory note, written 
contract, or other writing allow at least one party to recover 
attorney's fees. 
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UTAH R. CIV. P. 54(d). Costs. 
Except when express provision therefore is made either in a 
statute of this state or in these rules, costs shall be allowed as 
of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise 
directs . . . . 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Nature of Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition Below 
After being terminated for failure to perform (R. 2552, 3678 f 10), Stephen A. 
Giusti ("Plaintiff), filed a Complaint on July 11, 2000, which was amended on August 9, 
2000, alleging Fraud in the Inducement of Plaintiffs Employment and Employment 
Contracts (Count I); Breach of Plaintiffs Employment Contracts (Count II); Breach of 
the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing (Count III); Breach of the Doctrine 
of Promissory Estoppel (Count IV); Interference With Employment Relationship and 
Defamation (Count V); and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (Count VI). (R. 
58-98; a copy is in Plaintiffs Addendum ("PI. Add.") 16). Plaintiffs Complaint centered 
on a common core of facts and related legal theories-Plaintiffs employment relationship 
and employment termination. (Id.). 
Defendants' Dismissal Motions 
Defendants filed successive motions seeking dismissal of Plaintiff s claims, each 
of which were granted. On January 2, 2001, the trial court dismissed defendant SunGard 
Data Systems, Inc. for lack of personal jurisdiction. (R. 596-598, PI. Add. 2). On March 
30, 2002, the trial court granted Defendants' motion to dismiss the three contract claims 
(Counts II-IV), which ruling was confirmed in an Order dated September 3, 2003. (R. 
3 
703-07, PL Add. 3; 2277-2279, PL Add. 7). On May 5, 2003, the trial court granted 
Plaintiffs request to voluntarily dismiss his claim for intentional infliction of emotional 
distress (Count VI). (R. 2102-2103). In an Order dated September 19, 2005, the trial 
court granted Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs tortious 
interference and defamation claims (Count V). (R. 3733-3738, PL Add. 8). In an Order 
Granting Summary Judgment and Dismissal of Plaintiff s Complaint with Prejudice dated 
November 17, 2006, Plaintiffs only remaining claim (Count I), alleging fraudulent 
inducement, was dismissed. (R. 3999-4002, PL Add. 10). In this order, the trial court 
granted Defendants' costs and authorized them to submit an attorney's fees request. {Id.). 
Plaintiff appealed the dismissal of his Complaint. (R. 4443-4444, Add. 14). 
Defendants' Request for Attorney's Fees and Costs 
The trial court entered a "Final Order" on June 8, 2007, denying Defendants' 
attorney's fees request on the grounds that Defendants failed to support their position that 
fees were authorized where Defendants were only the prevailing, not "non-defaulting" 
party. (R. 4433-4436, PI. Add. 11). Defendants' cross-appealed this decision on August 
20,2007. (R. 4450-53). 
Defendants submitted a Verified Memorandum of Costs on March 16, 2007, 
seeking $11,289.96 in deposition costs and $2,039.60 in other general costs. (R. 4378-
4382). The trial court granted $55.00 of Defendants' cost request. (R. 4456-58; PL Add. 
15). Defendants appealed on September 7, 2007. (R. 4469-71). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
I. The trial court properly dismissed SunGard Data Systems, Inc. for lack of 
personal jurisdiction based on uncontroverted facts that show that SunGard and SWC, 
Plaintiffs employer, have a typical parent-subsidiary relationship that does not justify 
piercing the corporate veil to subject SunGard to the jurisdiction of the Utah courts. 
II. Plaintiffs arguments appealing the dismissal of his contract claims all 
depend on the legal conclusion that Plaintiff had an employment agreement for a term of 
twelve months. The trial court correctly ruled that as a matter of law, Plaintiff did not 
have an employment agreement for a specified term. Plaintiff did not appeal or provide 
any argument on this point and therefore waived his right to appellate review. 
III. The trial court properly held that to make out a claim for fraudulent 
inducement, Plaintiff must establish damages and that the correct measure of damages on 
an employment fraud claim is the income and benefits a plaintiff gives up when he or she 
is fraudulently induced to accept new employment. Plaintiff failed to demonstrate that 
his purported fraudulent inducement to accept employment at SWC resulted in lower 
compensation than had he remained at Cambric, his prior employer. 
IV. The trial court was correct in dismissing Plaintiffs claim against individual 
Defendants Hyde and Erickson that they tortiously interfered with Plaintiffs employment 
relations with SWC by terminating Plaintiff based on their personal reasons and without 
any legitimate business justification. The uncontroverted facts show that Hyde and 
Erickson were employees of SWC; hiring and firing of employees were clearly within the 
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scope of their employment; and there was no evidence to establish that the termination of 
Plaintiff was based solely on personal motivation. 
V. Defendants are entitled to their attorney's fees in successfully defending 
against all of Plaintiff s claims. A Utah Supreme Court decision issued after the parties' 
briefing in the lower court, Bilanzich v. Lonetti, 2007 UT 26, 163 P.3d 728, moved the 
law forward by rejecting a narrow reading of an attorney's fee provision that granted fees 
to at least one of the parties in the litigation and holding that under those circumstances, 
the other party is entitled to fees under Utah's reciprocity statute, Utah Code Ann.§ 78-
27-56.5. Attorney's fees are authorized in this case under Plaintiffs employment 
agreement. For the same reason, Defendants are entitled to their costs. In the alternative, 
Defendants are entitled to more than witness fees under Rule 54(d). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Sterling Wentworth Corporation ("SWC"), Plaintiffs employer, is a Utah 
corporation with its principal place of business in Salt Lake City, Utah. (R. 61, PL Add. 
16 f 10). 
2. Defendant SWC is a wholly-owned subsidiary of SunGard Investment 
Ventures, Inc., a Delaware corporation with its headquarters in Wilmington, Delaware; 
SunGard Investment Ventures, Inc. is a wholly owned subsidiary of Defendant SunGard 
Data Systems, Inc. ("SunGard"), a Delaware corporation headquartered in Wayne, 
Pennsylvania. (R. 190-92, PI. Add. 20 ]f 6). SunGard is a holding company which does 
not sell any products or services. (R. 190-92, PI. Add. 20 \ 8). 
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3. SunGard and SWC maintain separate and distinct corporate identities; each 
maintains its own independent bylaws, minutes, books, corporate records, financial 
records, bank accounts, and Board of Directors. (R. 440, PI. Add. 20 J^ 5). 
4. On November 7, 1999, plaintiff signed a letter from SWC President John C. 
Hyde ("Hyde") dated October 29, 1999, accepting an offer of employment from SWC as 
Vice President of Sales, (the "November 7 contract"). The letter covered the terms of 
Plaintiffs compensation, including base salary, override, commissions, the amount of a 
draw, stock options, vacation and benefits. With respect to the draw, the letter stated that 
Plaintiffs compensation would consist of a "non-recoverable draw for a 12 month 
period" at a rate of $7,500 per month, unless he elected to go to the "commission and 
override plan." (R. 83-85, Pi's Add. 4). 
5. Upon his hire, Plaintiff entered into a written agreement entitled "Sterling 
Wentworth Corporation Employment Agreement" ("SWC Employment Agreement") 
dated December 5, 1999. The parties to the SWC Employment Agreement are Plaintiff 
and SWC. The SWC Employment Agreement does not contain any terms addressing 
Plaintiffs compensation package. (R. 423-427, Pi's Add. 6). 
6. On December 16, 1999, Plaintiff signed the same October 29, 1999 offer 
letter from SWC President Hyde, with an initialed change indicating that he would 
receive " 1 % override on corporate revenue." (R. 91-93, PI. Add. 5). 
7. The SWC Employment Agreement (i) superseded any prior representations 
or agreements between the parties, (ii) contained an acknowledgment that Plaintiff was 
not relying on any representations outside the Agreement, (iii) gave SWC the right to 
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terminate Plaintiffs employment without cause, and (iv) provided for attorney's fees and 
costs for the non-defaulting party. Specific pertinent provisions are: 
6.2. Termination With or Without Cause: Employer may 
terminate Employees' employment with Employer without cause at 
any time upon two (2) weeks advance written notice to Employee. 
7.3. Miscellaneous: This Agreement constitutes the entire 
understanding and agreement between the Parties and supersedes all 
prior agreements, representations and understanding of the Parties. 
This Agreement may not be amended or modified except by an 
instrument in writing signed by each of the Parties. Each party 
acknowledges and agrees that he is not relying upon any 
representations, warranties, or other statements concerning the 
subject matter of this Agreement . . . . In the event either party 
defaults in any of the terms or provisions of this Agreement the non-
defaulting party shall be entitled to recover its, his or her reasonable 
attorney's fees and costs incurred[,] whether or not suit is 
commenced or final judgment obtained. 
(R. 426, PI. Add. 6). 
8. Prior to joining SWC in December of 1999, Plaintiff was employed by 
Cambric Corporation ("Cambric") from June 11, 1999 to November 20, 1999. (R. 2751, 
3674 1f 1). Plaintiffs salary at Cambric was $125,000 per year. (R. 3751, 3674 ^ 2). 
Plaintiff received one bonus in the amount of $25,000 while employed by Cambric plus 
an $800 per month car allowance. (R. 2751, 3674 1ffl 2-3). 
9. On or about November 20, 1999, Plaintiff voluntarily resigned his 
employment with Cambric in order to accept employment with SWC. (R. 2751, 3675 | 
6). Plaintiffs salary at SWC was $180,000 for the first year, consisting of $90,000 
annual salary plus a non-recoverable draw of $7,500 per month. (R. 2752, 3677 f 9). 
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10. At the time of Plaintiffs termination, Hyde was SWC's Group CEO and 
Paul Erickson ("Erickson") was SWC's President; together they were responsible for the 
operation of SWC. (R. 2752, 3679 ffi[ 14-15). 
11. On May 12, 2000, SWC terminated Plaintiffs employment based on 
performance. (R. 2552, 3678 f^ 10). Hyde's dissatisfaction with Plaintiff was based on a 
variety of performance-based issues including that: 1) Plaintiff was not active enough in 
driving revenue and closing deals for the company; 2) Plaintiff was not sufficiently 
familiar with SWC's products; 3) some of the salespeople had complained about 
Plaintiff; and 4) Plaintiff was not effective in promoting SWC's products, motivating and 
training the sales organization, dealing with customers, helping to close deals, and 
interacting with team members. (R. 2753, 3680 f^ 18). In contemporaneous email 
communications with Erickson, Hyde raised a host of concerns he had regarding 
Plaintiffs performance: 
[T]he four issues that I want to speak to with Steve are the 
following: 1) Hitting our revenue targets. This does not 
mean actively reporting on forecasts and pipelines. It means 
driving revenue and getting the job done. I look to the vp of 
sales as the one who ultimately puts the rock on his back and 
carries it. He has to be actively DRIVING revenue and 
taking ownership of the goals and making it happen. He 
needs to know how to get in and close deals not just manage 
and train reps. There is a big difference between the two. 2) 
Credibility and confidence with his sales people. Bottom line 
they are not responding well to his management style and 
process. They do not view him as someone who is helping 
them but rather is demanding a lot with not much in return. 
This is probably my biggest concern. 3) He is not creating a 
working relationship with the two people outside his 
organization that he needs the most. Phil Harker and Chad 
Gardner. He has alienated both. They have not readily 
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accepted him either but he has not found a way to work with 
them and they need to be his biggest supporters. 4) He is 
viewed by many in SWC as a bully and they do not like 
working with him. This is again a style issue but is not 
serving him well. 
(R. 2753-54, 3684 f 20). On May 4, 2000, Hyde wrote to Erickson and reiterated his 
concerns regarding Plaintiff: 
For me all the warning signs are there right in front of us. 1) 
He has no credibility with his own representative. 2) He 
hasn't taken on a single deal and closed it in his 5 months 
with the company. 3) He has spent less than 20 days on the 
road in his first 5 months. 4) He still says he is coming up to 
speed on our products and knows less about them than the 
representatives. 5) He has alienated those that he needs the 
most (Chad, Troy, Phil). 6) People don't like working with 
him (Ami won't even talk to him unless she absolutely has 
to). 7) He has not taken ownership of the revenue numbers. 
8) He is not a leader he is a manager. 
(R. 2754, 3686^21). 
12. Erickson testified that his dissatisfaction with Plaintiff was based on 
concerns different from Hyde's, and culminated in Plaintiffs refusal to commit to any set 
of revenue targets by which he would be willing to be measured. More specifically, 
Erickson explained that, despite Hyde's dissatisfaction with Plaintiff, Erickson was 
prepared to retain Plaintiff if he would: 1) commit to specific revenue targets to be set by 
Plaintiff; and 2) devise a plan to accomplish the revenue goals. (R. 2755, 3686 ^ 22). By 
May 2000, Erickson was looking for a statement of confidence, direction and energy 
from Plaintiff. (R. 2755, 3686 U 22). Plaintiffs failure to agree to a concrete set of 
revenue goals or articulate a plan, coupled with his admission that he simply did not 
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know what to do to meet such goals, ultimately caused Erickson to terminate Plaintiff 
(after Plaintiff turned down two alternative SWC positions). (R. 2755, 3687 % 23). 
13. On June 22, 2000, Plaintiff obtained employment with Callware 
Technologies, Inc. ("Callware"). (R. 2752, 3678 f^ 11). He remained employed by 
Callware during the litigation. (Id.). Plaintiffs base salary at Callware when hired was 
$125,000 per year. (R. 2752, 3678 1f 12). In addition to base salary, Plaintiff has 
received sales commissions from Callware. (R. 2752, 3678 f 13). 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED SUNGARD FOR LACK OF 
PERSONAL JURISDICTION 
The law that the lower court applied in dismissing SunGard for lack of personal 
jurisdiction in Utah is not in dispute: "Companies conducting business through their 
subsidiaries can qualify as transacting business in a state provided the parent exercises 
sufficient control over the subsidiary...." Litster v. Aha Corp., 2006 WL 3327906 (D. 
Utah Nov. 14, 2006). (emphasis added).1 See also, Fisher Baking Co. v. Continental 
Banking Corp., 238 F. Supp. 322, 326 (D. Utah 1965) (court declined to exercise 
personal jurisdiction over parent company where parent's control over wholly-owned 
subsidiary of nature that might be expected between parent and subsidiary). 
Courts have long recognized that a typical parent/subsidiary relationship involves 
some amount of control, direction and supervision by the parent, and that this does not 
destroy the separate corporate identities between the parent and subsidiary such that 
All unpublished decisions are provided in the addendum. 
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personal jurisdiction is conferred over the parent. See, e.g., IDS Life Ins. Co. v. 
SunAmerica Life Ins. Co., 136 F.3d 537, 540 (7th Cir. 1998) (recognizing that parents of 
wholly owned subsidiaries necessarily control, direct, and supervise subsidiaries to some 
extent but unless there is basis to pierce the corporate veil, parent is not liable for the torts 
of its subsidiary and there is no personal jurisdiction over parent).2 
In Fisher Baking Co., the parent's "control" over the subsidiary consisted of 
receiving reports on the subsidiary's operations; receiving summaries of the minutes of 
the meetings of the subsidiary's stockholders and board of directors; approving certain 
leases of the subsidiary; approving some major purchases of the subsidiary, including 
property and business acquisitions; setting the salary of the subsidiary's Chairman of the 
Board and Chief Executive Officer and approving salary increases for certain other key 
officers; and including certain subsidiary officers in stock option, bonus and retirement 
annuity plans. Id. at 325. Additionally, substantial inter-corporate telephonic 
communication occurred between the management personnel of the parent and 
subsidiary, and the parent was kept closely informed of the operations of the subsidiary 
See also, Sammons Enterprises, Inc. v. Superior Court, 205 Cal. App.3d 1427 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1988) (nonresident parent corporation not subject to personal jurisdiction based 
solely on independent activities of wholly owned subsidiary even where parent exercises 
general executive responsibility for operations of subsidiary and reviews its major policy 
decisions); Savin Corp. v. Heritage Copy Prod., Inc., 661 F. Supp. 463, 469-470 (M.D. 
Pa. 1987) (where four of twelve directors of subsidiary were current or former officers of 
parent, a director of parent made weekly visits to oversee the operations of subsidiary, 
and the parent had input regarding the salaries of the subsidiary's top-level executives, 
court held that type of control parent exhibited was "no more than what would be 
expected of a majority shareholder"). 
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through financial statements, other reports, audits and general supervision by officers of 
the parent as to financial records and reporting. Id. at 325-26. 
The Fisher Baking court found that this level of activity was natural and 
permissible between a parent and subsidiary. Id. at 327. Given that the two companies 
had their own articles of incorporation, by-laws, directors, officers, books of account, 
bank accounts and operating employees, and the formal separateness of the parent and 
subsidiary had not been substantially disregarded, the court held that the parent was not 
subjected to personal jurisdiction in Utah. Id. at 325.4 
In this case, the undisputed facts, many of which are contained in an affidavit of 
Andrew P. Bronstein, the Vice President/Controller of SunGard Data Systems, Inc., 
demonstrate that SunGard and SWC had a normal parent/subsidiary relationship. SWC 
is a Utah corporation with its principal place of business in Salt Lake City, Utah. (R. 61, 
PI. Add. 16 TJ10). SWC is a wholly-owned subsidiary of SunGard Investment Ventures, 
Inc., a Delaware corporation with its headquarters in Wilmington, Delaware; SunGard 
The court explained: "[A] parent company doesn't have to be insulated from any 
influence, information or reports concerning the operations of its subsidiary. The two 
corporations do not have to live in two entirely [sic] business worlds as the price of their 
recognition as separate entities." Id. at 326; accord Benton v. Cameco Corp., 375 F.3d 
1070, 1081 (10th Cir. 2004) (existence of officers and directors in common does not 
constitute parental control of a subsidiary). 
See also LaSalle National Bank v. Vitro, Sociedad Anonima, 85 F. Supp. 2d 857, 865-66 
(N.D. 111. 2000) (it is normal for parent to have comprehensive business plan for its 
subsidiary and to control, direct and supervise subsidiary to some extent); International 
Customs Assoc, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 893 F. Supp. 1251, 1255-56 (S.D. N.Y. 1995) 
(where parent was not signatory on contract between plaintiff and subsidiary, no claim 
stated against parent for alleged breach of subsidiary's contract). 
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Investment Ventures, Inc. is a wholly owned subsidiary of SunGard, a Delaware 
corporation headquartered in Wayne, Pennsylvania. (R. 190-92, PL Add. 20 ^|6). 
SunGard is a holding company which does not sell any products or services. (Id. ^8). It 
does not manage or direct SWC operations; SWC is run as a separate and distinct 
corporate entity. (Id. %5). SunGard and SWC maintain separate and distinct corporate 
identities; and each maintains its own independent bylaws, minutes, books, corporate 
records, financial records, bank accounts, and Board of Directors. (Id.). On November 
7, 1999, Plaintiff signed a letter from SWC President Hyde dated October 29, 1999, 
accepting an offer of employment from SWC as Vice President of Sales. (R. 83-85, Pi's 
Add.4). Upon his hire, Plaintiff entered into the SWC Employment Agreement dated 
December 5, 1999. The parties to the SWC Employment Agreement are Plaintiff and 
SWC. (R. 423-427, Pi's Add. 6). 
In dismissing SunGard for lack of personal jurisdiction, the lower court, 
recognizing the governing legal principles, held: 
Accepting the factual allegations contained in Plaintiffs First 
Amended Complaint as true, those allegations are legally 
insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction over SunGard. 
As a matter of law, SunGard and Sterling Wentworth 
Corporation have a typical parent-subsidiary relationship that 
does not justify piercing the corporate veil to subject SunGard 
to the jurisdiction of this Court. 
(R. 597). 
Plaintiff argues on appeal that the lower court considered matters outside the 
pleadings. (Plaintiffs Brief "PL Br." 29). This complaint is puzzling. He himself 
recognizes in his brief that a trial court is permitted to consider evidence outside the 
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pleadings when deciding a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction over a 
defendant. See OMI Holdings v. Royal Ins. Co. of Can., 149 F.3d 1086, 1091 (10th Cir. 
1998) (explaining that plaintiff can make its showing by using an "affidavit or other 
written materials"); (PL Br. 29). 
On appeal Plaintiff also argues that he was required to make more than a prima 
facie showing of jurisdiction over SunGard. (PL Br. 29). Plaintiff apparently bases his 
argument on the volume, as opposed to the content, of the allegations he made regarding 
SunGard's activities in Utah. However, Plaintiff was required to submit well pleaded 
facts as opposed to speculative or conclusory allegations in opposing SunGard's motion. 
Intercon, Inc. v. Bell Atlantic Internet, 205 F.3d 1244, 1247 (10th Cir. 2000) (explaining 
that only well pleaded facts of plaintiffs complaint, as distinguished from mere 
conclusory allegations, will be accepted as true). Plaintiffs allegations regarding 
SunGard's activities in the State are all conclusory; he relies on his allegations against 
SWC as the basis for an alleged activity of SunGard in Utah based on the legal 
conclusion that SWC and SunGard are one and the same. For example, an allegation that 
SWC, Plaintiffs employer, provided employment benefits to Plaintiff, is the basis for 
Plaintiffs allegation that SunGard engaged in business activity in Utah by providing 
employment benefits to Plaintiff. 
Plaintiff also argues that the lower court disregarded disputes of facts, weighed the 
evidence against him and should have allowed Plaintiff to conduct discovery. (PL Br. 
29). But Plaintiff fails to put forward any specific dispute of material fact, to show how 
or what evidence was weighed against him, or to "identify what discovery he seeks or 
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why it would be fruitful to the precise issues before the Court"; consequently, this Court 
should decline to consider this argument. NcNeill v. Geostar, 2007 WL 1577671, at *3 
(D. Utah May 29, 2007); see also, Phillips v. Hatfield, 904 P.2d 1108, 1109-10 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1995) (declining to address appellant's argument where he set forth little legal 
analysis on the issue presented, did not specifically discuss how the trial court erred and 
did not marshal the evidence). 
In his appellate argument that general personal jurisdiction over SunGard is 
present, Plaintiff recites the language of Utah's Long Arm Statute-not well-pleaded 
facts-stating that SunGard "engaged in substantial and continuous business activities in 
Utah" by "transacting business in Utah"; "contracting to supply services or goods in 
Utah"; "causing tortious injury and damage . . . in Utah; and by "owning, using or 
possessing property in Utah." (PI. Br. 32). Plaintiff fails to provide even one example of 
a fact indicating that SunGard's control over SWC was greater than normally associated 
with a parent/subsidiary relationship much less a factual dispute that should be 
considered by this Court. 
Likewise, in his argument that he established specific personal jurisdiction over 
SunGard, he states broad, conclusory allegations, never puts forward any example of 
conflicting evidence allegedly decided in SunGard's favor, and again, makes unfounded 
substitutions of SunGard in the allegations against SWC. For example, he states that 
SunGard engaged in the activity of "recruiting of employees in Utah, including Plaintiff 
Giusti, by Hyde and Erickson" based on SWC's recruiting of Plaintiff in Utah; and that 
SunGard engaged in the activity of "causing tortious injury resulting in economic, 
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reputation and emotional damages" to Plaintiff based on his claim that SWC's 
termination of his employment caused such an injury. (PL Br. 33). 
In sum, the lower court did not disregard any dispute of fact, did not weigh the 
evidence, require more than a prima facie showing of jurisdiction by Plaintiff, or 
improperly deny Plaintiff the opportunity to conduct discovery before ruling on the 
jurisdiction question. Accordingly, the decision to dismiss SunGard for lack of personal 
jurisdiction should be affirmed. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
ON PLAINTIFF'S CONTRACT CLAIMS, 
A, As a Matter of Law, the November 7 contract did not Create a Twelve-
Month Term of Employment. 
Plaintiff raises three arguments in support of his appeal of the trial court's decision 
to dismiss his contract claims.5 He argues that Section 7.3 of the SWC Employment 
Agreement allows him to rely on his November 7 contract for employment for a term of 
twelve months; he did not agree to modify the November 7 contract granting him 
employment for a term of twelve months; and he was fraudulently induced by Human 
Resources Director Pat Black to sign the SWC Employment Agreement of December 5, 
1999 that contained an at-will provision. (PI. Br. 34-40). All three arguments are based 
on the incorrect underlying legal conclusion that Plaintiff had a November 7, 1999 
"contract" that provided him with "a minimum term" of twelve months employment at 
Plaintiffs contract claims are: Breach of Contract (Count II); Breach of the Implied 
Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing (Count III); and Breach of the Doctrine of 
Promissory Estoppel (Count IV). (R. 58-98). 
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SWC and thus his employment termination after five months was unlawful. (PI. Br. 35, 
36, 38, Pi's Add. 4). 
The facts relating to the November 7 contract are these. On November 7, 1999, 
Plaintiff signed a letter dated October 29, 1999, accepting an offer of employment from 
SWC as Vice President of Sales. (R. 83-85). The November 7 contract covered the 
terms of Plaintiffs compensation, including base salary, override, commissions, the 
amount of a draw, stock options, vacation and benefits. (R. 83-85). With respect to the 
draw, the letter stated that Plaintiffs compensation would consist of a "non-recoverable 
draw for a twelve month period" at a rate of $7,500 per month, unless within the "twelve-
month period" he elected to go to the "commission and override plan." (R. 83-85, PI. 
Add. 4). 
On December 5, 1999 Plaintiff and SWC entered into the SWC Employment 
Agreement. (R. 423-27, PI. Add. 6). The SWC Employment Agreement does not 
contain any terms addressing Plaintiffs compensation package but does contain a section 
indicating that SWC may terminate Plaintiffs employment without cause at any time 
upon two weeks' advance written notice: 
6.2 Termination With or Without Cause. Employer may 
terminate Employee's employment with Employer without 
cause at any time upon two (2) weeks advance written notice to 
Employee. Employee may terminate Employee's employment 
with Employer with or without cause at any time upon two (2) 
weeks advance written notice to Employer. 
(R. 426, PL Add.6). 
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On December 16, 1999, Plaintiff signed the same October 29, 1999 offer letter 
from SWC President Hyde that he had signed on November 7, with an initialed change 
indicating that he would receive " 1 % override on corporate revenue." (R. 91-93, 58-98, 
PL Add. 5). 
Plaintiffs reliance on the legal conclusion that the November 7 contract 
established that SWC agreed to employ Plaintiff for a term of twelve months is contrary 
to the lower court's ruling: 
The question addressed by the parties in their supplemental 
briefing on the matter was whether the final offer letter, 
signed after the employment agreement, modified the 
employment agreement by adding a definite term of 
employment for at least the first year. The letters do not 
conflict with, nor refer to the employment agreement, each 
providing different portions of the agreement between the 
parties. The language of the offer letters clearly discuss the 
provision of certain benefits associated with Plaintiffs 
employment with Sterling Wentworth. Even standing alone, 
these terms, especially the providing for a monthly subsidy, 
while assuming the employment relationship between the 
parties will last for at least a year express only the timing of 
the benefits and compensation while Plaintiff is in 
Defendants' employ. When read with the explicit provision 
in the employment agreement stating employment may be 
terminated with or without cause, any doubt to the contrary 
is conclusively resolved. 
(R. 703-07, PL Add. 3) (emphasis added).6 
Plaintiff had argued below that both signed October 29, 1999 offer letters established 
that he had a contract for a specified term of twelve months (R. 343) thus the lower 
court's order first refers to the "final offer letter," meaning the October 29, 1999 offer 
letter signed on December 12, 1999. The court's order then refers to "letters," meaning 
both signed October 29, 1999 offer letters - the one signed on November 7 and the one 
with a slight revision signed on December 12, 1999. (R. 704). 
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Plaintiff does not directly appeal or provide any argument on appeal in opposition 
to the lower court ruling that the offer letter he signed on November 7, 1999 does not 
establish employment for a specified term. {See, e.g., PL Br. 2 % 2-noticeably absent is 
any discussion on this issue). Therefore the trial court's decision stands and Plaintiffs 
appeal of the dismissal of his contract claims fails. Phillips, 904 P. 2d at 1109-10. 
Even if Plaintiff had appealed the lower court's ruling on his November 7 contract, 
the lower court made the correct decision: As a matter of law, SWC's informing plaintiff 
about how his compensation would be paid over a twelve-month period of time does not 
convert his hiring into employment for a specific term. 
Under Utah law, a promise by an employer to continue employment for a specified 
period must be clear and definite: 
There must be a manifestation of the employer's intent that is 
communicated to the employee and sufficiently definite to 
operate as a contract provision. Furthermore the 
manifestation of the employer's intent must be of such a 
nature that the employee can reasonably believe that the 
employer is making an offer of employment other than 
employment at will. 
Johnson v. Morton Thiokollnc, 818 P.2d 997, 1002 (Utah 1991). 
The Utah Court of Appeals has applied this standard to a case in which a plaintiff 
claimed that statements by his employer involving future time periods in his employment 
created a contract for a specified time. Evans v. GTE Health Sys. Inc., 857 P.2d 974 
(Utah Ct. App. 1993). In Evans, GTE told Evans, in the process of offering Evans a 
position as a sales representative in 1989, that: 
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[I]n his first year of employment he would be expected to sell 
his home and relocate to Miami, attend an IBM sales agent 
training program, become familiar with GTE products and 
begin making contacts . . . . [Evans was also told that] he was 
not expected to close significant sales until the end of 1990 or 
early 1991 and that he would not be terminated unless he was 
unable to close sales by the first or second quarter of 1991. 
857 P.2d at 975. Less than two and one-half months after Evans had begun work, his 
employment was terminated. Evans claimed that GTE's assurances that he would not 
have to close sales until the end of 1990 or the beginning of 1991 created a contract for a 
specified time period. Affirming summary dismissal of Evans' claim, the appellate court 
specifically rejected that argument: 
As for the assurances that Evans would not have to close sales 
until the end of 1990 or the beginning of 1991, these sorts of 
comments fall more into the category of general job 
descriptions than binding manifestations of the employer's 
intent to enter into a contract for a specified time period. GTE 
was basically explaining the length of the sales cycle to Evans 
so that he would know that GTE did not expect him to 
immediately begin to close sales and that GTE would not be 
concerned about his sales record until late 1990 or early 1991. 
If this court were to perceive an implied contract to employ 
Evans for a definite time period based upon these 
representations, then an employer could never tell a 
potential employee in a job interview what was expected of 
him or her over the next few months or years without 
creating such a contract 
Id. at 977-78 (emphasis added). Thus, the Evans court rejected the plaintiffs attempt to 
recharacterize a reference to a specified time period made during a discussion about the 
parties' expectations as a contract of employment for a specific duration. 
This fundamental principle-that telling a potential employee what to expect over a 
specified time does not create a contract of employment for a term-underlies the well-
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established rule that an employee is not hired for a definite term by specifying his 
compensation over a particular time period. For example, in Garcia v. Aetna Fin. Co., 
752 F.2d 488 (10th Cir. 1984), the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected a plaintiffs 
claim for breach of an employment contract for a specified term based on the employer's 
statement quoting the salary for a year: 
As to plaintiffs contention that defendant's rehiring on a 
salary based on a yearly amount implied a fixed term of 
employment, "unless the circumstances indicate otherwise, a 
contract which sets forth an annual salary rate but states no 
definite term of employment is considered to be indefinite 
employment, terminable at the will of either party without 
incurring liability for breach of contract." 
752 F.2d at 491 (citing Justice v. Stanley Aviation Corp., 530 P.2d 984, 986 (Co. 1974)).7 
7
 Accord Tarr v. Credit Suisse Asset Mgmt, Inc., 958 F. Supp. 785, 804-05 (E.D.N.Y. 
1997) (where executive hired in 1991 entered into memorandum of understanding 
containing annual salary, yearly salary increases and bonuses through 1993, no 
employment contract through 1993 was created); Simmons v. John F. Kennedy Medical 
Center, 727 F. Supp. 440, 443 (N.D. 111. 1991) (motion to dismiss granted where plaintiff 
offered annual salary and tuition reimbursement for two-year MBA program; no contract 
for fixed duration arose); Lubore v. RPM Assoc, Inc., 61A A.2d 547, 553-54 (Md. Ct. 
Spec. App. 1995,) (where individual was hired as marketing and sales executive, offer 
letter stating annual base salary and "Projected Year 1" and "Projected Year 2" total 
salary did not create contract for two-year duration, but simply was concerned with 
manner in which compensation was projected); Singh v. Cities Service Oil Co., 554 P.2d 
1367, 1369 (Okla. 1976) (court rejected claim of employment for definite term where 
compensation was quoted for one-year term, adopting "American doctrine": contract 
"which merely specifies a salary proportionate to units of time which are utilized for the 
purposes of accounting or payment" does not indicate that employment is to continue for 
stated unit of time); Loeffler v. Kjellgren, 884 S.W.2d 463, 468 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994) 
(where letters "simply set forth what plaintiff could expect to earn by way of 
compensation if he continued to work for Fleetline [for four years] ... no guarantee of 
employment for a definite term"); Thompson v. Telco, Inc., 1999 WL 548610 (Tenn. Ct. 
App. July 29, 1999) (letter agreement was employment contract, but letter's guarantee of 
compensation over five years was held to convey only level at which plaintiff would be 
compensated, not length of time he would be employed). 
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Because the November 7 contract does not establish an agreement as to duration 
of employment, Plaintiffs was an indefinite hiring, terminable at the will of either party, 
consistent with Plaintiffs SWC Employment Agreement which contains express 
language stating unambiguously that SWC may terminate Plaintiffs employment without 
cause at any time. 
Because the November 7 contract did not provide Plaintiff with employment for a 
twelve-month term, Plaintiffs first argument that his written employment agreement with 
SWC of December 5, 1999 (PI. Add. 6) specifically allows him to rely on the prior 
November 7 contract, fails as a matter of law. (PL Br. 34-35). The Employment 
Agreement contains a clear and unambiguous statement that Plaintiffs "employment may 
be terminated without cause at any time upon two (2) weeks advance written notice." 
Plaintiff points to an exception for "related documents" in the integration clause 
contained in the SWC Employment Agreement in arguing that his November 7 contract 
governs, and he was not at-will: 
7.3 Miscellaneous. This Agreement constitutes the entire 
understanding and agreement between the Parties and 
supersedes all prior agreements, representations and 
understanding of the Parties.... Each party acknowledges and 
agrees that he is not relying upon any representations, 
warranties or other statements concerning the subject matter 
of this Agreement except as may be expressly set forth in this 
agreement or related documents. 
This argument fails for two reasons. First, because Plaintiff never made this 
argument below, he waived the right to appeal this issue. 438 Main Street v. Easy Heat, 
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Inc., 2004 UT 72, % 51, 99 P.3d 801 (Utah 2004) (to preserve an issue for appeal, among 
other things, "the issue must be specifically raised" in the trial court); Coleman v. 
Stevens, 2000 UT 98 K 9, 17 P.3d 1122 (three issues plaintiff failed to raise before the 
trial court would not be considered on appeal and it was not plain error or manifest justice 
to preclude plaintiff from arguing the issues in the reply on appeal). Second, this 
argument fails for the additional and overriding reason that, as discussed above, the 
underlying assumption that the November 7 contract guaranteed Plaintiff employment for 
a term of twelve months is not legally correct and is not subject to review on this appeal. 
Plaintiff next argues on appeal that the dismissal of his contract claims was 
incorrect because he did not agree to modify the November 7 contract to hire him for a 
minimum of twelve months. (PL Br. 36-37). Once again, the November 7 contract was 
not an agreement to employ Plaintiff for a term of twelve months. 
Lastly, Plaintiff argues on appeal that the dismissal of his contract claims was 
incorrect because the SWC Employment Agreement, including its at-will provision, was 
fraudulently induced by Pat Black, the SWC Human Resources Director, who allegedly 
told Plaintiff he was "was required to sign the Agreement in order to obtain his 
employment benefits [when] no such requirement existed." (PI. Br. 15 \ 17, 38). Like 
his first arguments Plaintiff never made the argument in the trial court that Pat Black 
fraudulently induced the SWC Employment Agreement and cannot now raise it on 
appeal. 438 Main Street, 2004 UT 72, ^ 51. Even if it were an issue for this Court's 
review, as discussed above, as a matter of law, the November 7 contract was not an 
agreement to employ Plaintiff for a term of twelve months. Consequently, without an 
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agreement as to duration of employment, Plaintiffs was an indefinite hiring, terminable 
at the will of either party regardless of the SWC Employment Agreement. In other 
words, even if he had not signed the SWC Employment agreement, he would still be an 
at-will employee. 
In sum, the lower court correctly concluded that SWC's decision to terminate 
Plaintiffs employment is not a breach of contract or a breach of a covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing and Plaintiff has no claim for promissory estoppel. 
B. Plaintiffs Contract Claims Not Related to His Termination Were 
Properly Dismissed. 
Plaintiffs final point in appealing the dismissal of his contract claims is an attempt 
to revive breach of contract allegations that supposedly do not relate to his termination 
from employment. He argues that the trial court failed to "recognize" that he asserted 
contractual claims unrelated to his employment termination. (PL's Br. 39). In a footnote 
in his appellate brief, Plaintiff lists the alleged "other" contract claims, summarized as 
follows: 
(1) Failure to pay Plaintiff commissions or bonuses beyond the date of his 
employment termination; 
(2) Failure to give him information to properly train his sales team; 
(3) Undermining his authority by communicating with employees who reported 
to him; 
(4) Threatening to terminate his employment "for cause;" 
(5) Refusal to discuss his unsatisfactory performance; 
(6) Leading Plaintiff to believe that the sales team didn't need to meet its 
revenue goal for 2000. 
(PL's Br.39 n. 5). 
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In August 2000, Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiffs contract claims-Counts 
II, III and IV of Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint-pointing out that Plaintiffs 
contract claims not related to termination were actually complaints that he did not receive 
things that were cut off by his termination. (R. 154-58). Plaintiff did not address the 
issue in his response to Defendant's motion. (R. 340-97). The court dismissed Counts II, 
III and IV of Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint in an Order entered March 30, 2002. 
(R. 703-704; PI. Add 3). 
In August of 2003, Plaintiff requested that the lower court clarify the status of his 
contract claims and argued that those not related to his termination remained at issue in 
the case. (R. 2158-63). Defendants opposed Plaintiffs position on those claims. (R. 
2230-36). In his reply memorandum (R. 2255), Plaintiff listed his contract claims not 
related to his termination. Only two of the so-called contract claims not related to 
termination that Plaintiff cites in his appellate brief were listed in the pleading below in 
which Plaintiff tried to revive the allegations: number 1-compensation he would have 
received had he not been terminated; and number 6-statements that led Plaintiff to 
believe he would not be held to revenue production goals in 2000. 
The lower court, in an order entered September 4, 2003, confirmed that its intent 
in the March 30, 2002 order was to dismiss the three counts of Plaintiff s First Amended 
Complaint "which collectively comprise all of plaintiffs claims sounding in contract." 
(R. 2277-78). The lower court's decision that those two issues were dismissed was 
proper; they both were things that Plaintiff claimed he would have received had they not 
been cut off by his termination, which the trial court expressly held was lawful. 
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III. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANTS ON COUNT I, PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM FOR 
FRAUDULENT INDUCEMENT 
In addition to Plaintiffs several claims alleging that Defendants breached the 
contract by, among other things, wrongful termination, Plaintiff separately alleged in 
Count I that he had been fraudulently induced to leave his prior employment and join 
SWC. (R. 74). More specifically, Plaintiff claimed that in reliance on various alleged 
misrepresentations by Hyde and Erickson, he 
left his secure executive position at Cambric Corporation 
including the substantial salary, bonuses, benefits and 
opportunities for promotion he enjoyed in that employment, 
relinquished the possibility of employment in high paying 
executive positions in other companies and agreed to be 
employed by the defendants as the Vice President of Sales for 
SWC.. . . 
(R. 65 122). 
In its early motion to dismiss Plaintiffs fraud claim, Defendants argued that the 
terms of Plaintiffs at-will employment agreement foreclosed any action based on 
reliance upon terms other than those expressed in the agreement. (R. 148-50). While 
granting Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiffs contract claims, the trial court denied 
Defendants' motion regarding the fraudulent inducement claim based on the following 
rationale: 
While Plaintiff has argued his claims for fraudulent 
inducement refer to Defendants' inducing Plaintiff to enter 
into employment with the Defendant (which would be fatal in 
light of language in the employment agreement by which 
Plaintiff affirmatively acknowledges reliance upon only those 
terms expressed therein), the Court believes he misapplies the 
theory under the facts alleged in the complaint. The injury 
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for which Plaintiff seeks recovery does not rise from 
Plaintiffs entry into this employment agreement, but rather 
from his being induced to relinquish his previous 
employment based upon the fraudulent misrepresentations 
of the Defendants. The claim of fraudulent inducement is 
typically employed to avoid contractual obligations, either by 
a plaintiff, seeking rescission of the contract, or by a 
defendant, seeking to avoid his obligations thereunder. While 
Plaintiff expresses his first cause of action as fraudulent 
inducement, the Court reads that as a claim for recovery upon 
a more general fraud theory. 
(R. 705) (emphasis added). 
The trial court's reasoning correctly distinguished between Plaintiffs contract 
claims-which clearly sought damages related to earnings and benefits of which Plaintiff 
contended he had been deprived as a result of his wrongful termination-and Plaintiffs 
claim for fraudulent inducement, in which Plaintiff alleged he had been damaged by his 
abandonment of earnings and benefits from his prior employment. The trial court 
properly recognized that any damages Plaintiff sustained as a result of his alleged 
fraudulent inducement would be measured by comparing the compensation he forewent 
at his previous employment with his compensation following the alleged inducement. (R. 
705). This approach is entirely consistent with this Court's ruling in Ong International 
(U.S.A.), Inc. v. 11th Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d 447, 457 (Utah 1993) (in order to be 
recoverable, fraud damages must be a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the 
defendant's acts). Additionally, Utah courts have drawn a sharp distinction in the 
employment setting between contract and fraud damages. In Walker v. Micron 
Technology, Inc., 1998 WL 1769732, at *4-7 (Utah Dist. Ct. May 13, 1998), the 
plaintiffs, like Plaintiff, were employed at-will and, therefore, could not state a claim for 
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breach of an employment contract. Plaintiffs' fraud allegations, stated the court, were 
"simply trying to take another bite at the apple." Id. at *7. The court held that a 
"contract claim may not be pled as a fraud action in order to circumvent the 
unavailability of a contract remedy for a job termination." Id. at *8. Likewise, here, 
Plaintiff may not seek breach of contract damages based on allegations of fraud. 
To the extent that the Utah courts have not definitively confirmed that the proper 
measure of damages for fraudulent inducement in the employment context are those sums 
that would have been earned or recovered had the plaintiff not been improperly lured to 
resign his prior position, the trial court's decision dealt directly with the Plaintiffs own 
pleadings as well as the mainstream view among courts elsewhere. In Lokay v. Lehigh 
Valley Cooperative Farmers, Inc., 492 A.2d 405, 410-411 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985), for 
example, the Pennsylvania appellate court concluded that the proper measure of damages 
in a fraud claim like the instant one is the plaintiffs loss of salary and benefits from his 
prior employment. Like Plaintiff, plaintiff Lokay asserted that he was induced to resign 
from his prior employment (Topco) and join Lehigh Valley Cooperative Farmers 
("Lehigh Valley") based on fraudulent misrepresentations concerning Lehigh Valley's 
economic condition. Id. at 408. Lokay also claimed that Lehigh Valley breached his 
contract in terminating him. Id. On appeal from a verdict for the plaintiff, the appellate 
court observed that he had suffered two superficially related but nonetheless separate and 
distinct injuries: he was fraudulently induced to quit his former employment with Topco, 
and then was fired from his new employment with Lehigh Valley in breach of his 
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employment contract. Id. at 410. The court then explained that the plaintiffs damages 
for fraud were different from those for breach of contract: 
[I]n an employment context lost future income is in fact what 
the plaintiff loses when he is induced to leave an otherwise 
on-going position; this is not the archetypal fraud fact-pattern 
in which a plaintiff was tricked into buying something for 
more than it was worth, or selling for less than that (citations 
omitted). [Lokay's] loss of his salary and benefits from 
Topco was the injury caused by [Lehigh Valley's] fraudulent 
misrepresentations', his decrease in income following his 
dismissal from [Lehigh Valley] was the damage from [Lehigh 
Valley's] breach of contract. 
Id, at 410-11 (emphasis added).8 
Plaintiffs attempt to import a "benefit of the bargain" damages analysis into the 
employment setting-permitting the recovery of basic contract damages where such 
claims have all been dismissed-relies on fraud cases arising primarily in the context of 
property sales. These cases stand for the uncontested, but irrelevant, proposition that a 
victim of fraud is not required to disgorge benefits received under a contract before 
seeking damages for fraud. None of these cases involve an at-will employee's effort to 
recover forward-looking damages by alleging fraud in the inducement. For example, 
As in Lokay, courts in other jurisdictions have similarly limited damages in an 
employment fraud case to the income and benefits the plaintiff gave up when he or she 
was fraudulently induced to accept new employment. See, e.g., Lam v. American Express 
Co., 265 F. Supp. 2d 225, 233 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (plaintiffs fraud damages were "actual 
benefits to which he otherwise allegedly would have been entitled and which he waived 
in order to accept" employment with defendant); Kidder v. AmSouth Bank, N.A., 639 So. 
2d 1361, 1363 (Ala. 1994) (recognizing plaintiff would be entitled to recover damages 
for those losses she claimed resulted from her giving up the job she had in order to take 
the job with defendant); Brooks v. Doherty, Rumble & Butler, 481 N.W.2d 120, 128-129 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (purpose of damages on a claim for fraudulent inducement of 
employment is to "restore the plaintiff to his former status in life"). 
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Dilworth v. Lauritzen, 424 P.2d 136 (Utah 1967), concerned the plaintiffs contract for a 
distributorship within a particular territory. The plaintiff paid $5,000 consideration for 
the distributorship, and sought to recover $18,985 for out-of-pocket and punitive 
damages based on the defendant's allegedly fraudulent material omission that defendant 
failed to tell the plaintiff that there were already three other dealers operating in the same 
territory. Id. at 137. The court held that damages, if any, were measurable by reference 
to the value of the property interest purchased under the contract. Id. at 138. The court 
rejected the plaintiffs claim for "out-of-pocket" expenses, including expected profits and 
the value of his own time during the three months he operated his business, for failure to 
show proximate cause. Id. 
While Conder v. Williams & Associates, Inc., 739 P.2d 634 (Utah 1987), 
concerned a dispute in the employment arena, it did not involve an at-will employee who 
had been terminated. In Conder, the plaintiff sued his former employer for fraudulent 
inducement based on misrepresentations that he would have the opportunity to sell gold, 
silver, real estate and other securities, in addition to insurance. Id. at 636. The appellate 
court concluded that Plaintiff suffered at least "some damage" by virtue of his employer's 
misrepresentation despite having continued in his employment for a year after learning 
that his employer was "only an insurance agency," not "a full service financial 
company." Id. at 640, 636-37. The Conder court did not address in any fashion the 
correct measure of damages for fraudulent inducement of an at-will employee who is 
subsequently lawfully terminated. 
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In this regard, Plaintiffs reliance on McConkey v. Aon Corp., 804 A.2d 572 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002) is equally misplaced. In McConkey, plaintiff alleged that 
during his interview process, his prospective employer's Chief Executive Officer, Frank 
Zarb, falsely assured plaintiff that the company was not going to be acquired. Id. at 578. 
In response to direct questions by plaintiff about rumors he had heard to the contrary, 
Zarb stated that such rumors were "totally unfounded." Id. In fact, at the same time as 
he was making contrary assurances to plaintiff, Zarb was engaged in negotiations to sell 
the company. Id. at 579-82. Within seven months of being hired, plaintiff was 
terminated in a layoff resulting from the company's sale. Id. at 584. Thus, plaintiff in 
McConkey was wrongfully terminated as a preordained consequence of his employer's 
misrepresentation. Here, Plaintiff was not wrongfully terminated at all-Defendant S WC 
properly terminated Plaintiffs at-will employment based on performance-related issues, 
thereby extinguishing any forward-looking contract-based damages. Plaintiffs damages 
for any alleged fraudulent inducement are therefore limited to those arising out of his 
relinquishment of his prior employment at Cambric, damages the trial court found that 
Plaintiff utterly failed to establish.9 
9
 In challenging the trial court's ruling on his fraudulent inducement claim, Plaintiff 
raises yet again that his contract was for a guaranteed term of twelve months. (PI. Br. 
40-42). Even if this were true, which it plainly is not, it would have no bearing on the 
trial court's ruling regarding Count I-that the proper measure of damages for fraudulent 
inducement in an employment setting is the difference in compensation between the 
position that the employee left and the position he was allegedly induced to take. 
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Plaintiff further argues that by holding that in order to establish damages "it is 
incumbent upon Mr. Giusti to compare the income he earned post Cambric with what he 
earned while employed there" (PI. Br. 46), the trial court improperly placed the burden of 
proving mitigation on Plaintiff, not the Defendants. In the first place, Plaintiff never 
raised this argument below and, therefore, waived it on this appeal. 438 Main Street v. 
Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72, \ 51, 99 P.3d 801, 813 (to preserve an issue for appeal, 
among other things, "the issue must be specifically raised" in the trial court). In addition, 
however, Plaintiffs argument entirely misses the mark. A plaintiffs obligation to 
establish damages is a prerequisite to surviving summary judgment and has nothing to do 
with mitigation. The trial court correctly held that to make out a claim for fraudulent 
inducement, Plaintiff must establish damages. (R. 705). Because he had no viable claim 
that he had been wrongfully terminated as an at-will employee, Plaintiff had to 
demonstrate that his purported fraudulent inducement resulted in lower compensation 
than had he remained and Cambric. Plaintiff failed to do this. 
Finally, in an effort to salvage his claim, Plaintiff offers a smattering of issues he 
contends raise questions of fact the trial court overlooked. Plaintiff is wrong. First, 
Plaintiff contends that the trial court's Order dated April 21, 2006, incorrectly stated that 
Plaintiffs salary at Cambric was $125,000. (PI. Br. 44). In fact, in his opposition to 
Defendants' motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff stated it was "undisputed" that, 
"Giusti's salary at Cambric was $125,000 per year." (R. 3674 % 2). Even if Plaintiff s 
salary at Cambric had been $135,000, the trial court's ruling that Plaintiffs earnings 
subsequent to leaving Cambric were greater than his Cambric earnings would still be 
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correct. As the trial court found, Plaintiffs annual salary at SWC was $180,000 and his 
annual salary at Callware was $125,000 plus commissions and bonuses. (R. 3923). 
Thus, the aggregate of compensation from SWC and Callware plainly exceeded that at 
Cambric. 
Plaintiff also claims that the trial court improperly ruled that Plaintiffs reliance on 
potential future bonuses he would have earned at Cambric was unfounded due to the 
speculative nature of such bonuses. (PI. Br. 45-46). The trial court's ruling was correct 
because there is nothing in the record that provides a basis for concluding that Cambric's 
future economic performance as well as Plaintiffs future performance at Cambric would 
have resulted in any bonus. As the lower court stated: 
While Mr. Giusti relies upon claims for potential bonuses 
from Cambric, such claimed damages are speculative at best 
and cannot be proven with the requisite "reasonably 
certainty" because they are tied to the company's future 
economic performance as well as the plaintiffs future 
performance. It is not the possible bonus income but the 
received income that establishes the measure for damages. 
(R. 3824). 
Plaintiffs attempt to argue that there is a "factual issue" over whether he would 
have received an additional bonus at Cambric is simply untrue. Having failed to elicit 
any testimony or other evidence below establishing any basis to conclude that he would 
have received future bonuses, Plaintiff cannot now claim that this issue raised disputed 
issues of fact.10 
Significantly, while Plaintiff deposed Timothy P. Hayes, Cambric's President and 
Chief Executive Officer, Plaintiff chose not to elicit any testimony regarding whether 
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Finally, Plaintiffs argument that the trial court failed to acknowledge the fact that 
Plaintiffs compensation at Cambric included a monthly car allowance of $800 is 
incorrect. (PI. Br. 45). Once again, the record betrays Plaintiffs argument. In its Order 
of April 21, 2006, the trial court expressly recognized that, "At Cambric Mr. Giusti 
earned a $125,000 annual salary plus an $800 per month car allowance and was eligible 
for periodic bonuses." (R. 3923). As set forth above, this additional component of 
Plaintiffs compensation at Cambric does not disrupt the trial court's conclusion that 
Plaintiff had not established any damages. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANTS ON COUNT V, PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM FOR 
TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE 
Plaintiffs fifth cause of action alleged that Defendants Hyde and Erickson 
tortiously interfered with Plaintiffs employment relations with SWC by terminating 
Plaintiff based on Defendants' personal reasons and without any legitimate business 
justification. (R. 77 f 61).11 The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of 
Defendants on this claim, holding that: a) Hyde and Erickson were plainly employees of 
SWC; b) the hiring and firing of employees was clearly within the scope of Defendants' 
employment; and c) it was clear that "there is no evidence to establish that the 
Cambric's financial performance subsequent to Plaintiffs resignation would have 
triggered the payment of any bonus to Plaintiff had he remained. 
11
 Count V of the Amended Complaint also included a separate claim for defamation 
based on a series of statements allegedly made by Defendants Hyde and Erickson. (R. 
77-78). In its Order of September 15, 2005, the trial court, treating the defamation 
allegations as a discrete cause of action, granted Defendants' motion for summary 
judgment. (R. 3736-37). Plaintiff has not challenged this ruling on appeal. 
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termination of the plaintiff was based solely on a personal motivation by either Erickson 
or Hyde." (R. 3736). Plaintiffs contention that the trial court's ruling was in error finds 
no support in the law or in the record below. 
Plaintiff first argues, 
Although the district court held that "[T]here is no question that Erickson 
and Hyde were employees of SWC," Plaintiff Giusti presented evidence 
that Hyde was an executive of SunGard at the time of Giusti's termination. 
See, f^ 13, Statement of Facts at 14. Thus, the district court erred by failing 
to consider this evidence or by improperly resolving the parties' conflicting 
evidence on this issue against Plaintiff Giusti. 
(PI. Br. 47). 
It is hard to comprehend the nature of Plaintiffs argument. Whether Defendant Hyde 
was an executive of SunGard does not alter the fact that he was an employee of SWC, nor 
does it undermine the trial court's analysis. As the trial court correctly concluded, if the 
defendant is an employee of the entity with which a plaintiff claims he had an economic 
relationship, plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant acted outside the scope of his 
employment for purely personal reasons. (R. 3735); see also, Lichtie v. U.S. Home 
Corp., 655 F. Supp. 1026, 1028 (D. Utah 1987); Yu v. Northwest Pipeline Corp., 1991 
WL 355137, *6 (D. Utah June 11, 1991). Plaintiff fails altogether to cite any authority 
for the proposition that if the defendant employee is also an executive in the parent 
company, that the analysis somehow changes. To the extent there was "conflicting 
evidence" on the issue of whether Hyde was an executive of SunGard, the issue is of no 
moment to the trial court's ruling that Hyde and Erickson, as employees of SWC, were 
acting within the scope of their employment in terminating Plaintiff. 
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Plaintiff next contends that the trial court erred in holding that there was no 
evidence offered by Plaintiff to establish that the termination of plaintiff was based solely 
on a personal motivation by either Hyde or Erickson. (PI. Br. 47-48). First, Plaintiff 
does not, nor could he, challenge the correctness of the lower court's legal analysis. As 
the Lichtie court ruled, under Section 236 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, 
even if a defendant acts with mixed motives, which are in part driven by personal 
interests, a plaintiff cannot prevail: "[I]f an agent acts with mixed motives his or her 
conduct will be within the scope of employment." Lichtie, 655 F. Supp. at 1028. As the 
trial court recognized, "Case law is clear that to be outside the scope of authority, the 
employee must act from a purely personal motive in no way connected with the 
employer's interest." (R. 3735, citing Birkner v. Salt Lake County, 111 P.2d 1053, 1056-
57 (Utah 1989)). 
Second, Plaintiff does not, nor could he, argue that termination of an employee is 
outside the scope of the supervisor's employment. The question of whether an employee 
is acting within the scope of his authority has arisen in many other Utah cases. In Nunez 
v. Albo, M.D., 2002 UT App. 247, \ 18, 53 P.3d 2, the Utah Court of Appeals applied the 
same legal principles as Lichtie in affirming summary judgment for a doctor, determining 
as a matter of law that he was acting within the scope of his employment. The Nunez 
court held that an employee's conduct falls within the scope of employment if: 
First, . . . the conduct is of the general kind the employee is 
employed to perform . . . That means that an employee's acts 
or conduct must be generally directed toward the 
accomplishment of objectives within the scope of the 
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employee's duties and authority, or reasonably incidental 
thereto . . . . 
Second, the employee's conduct . . . occurs within the hours 
of the employee's work and the ordinary spatial boundaries of 
the employment . . . . 
Third, the employee's conduct is motivated, at least in part, 
by the purpose of serving the employer's interest. 
Id. at f 12 (citing Birkner v. Salt Lake County, 111 P.2d at 1056-57 (to be acting outside 
the scope of his authority, employee must act "from purely personal motives . . . in no 
way connected with the employer's interests" or his conduct must be "unprovoked, 
highly unusual, and quite outrageous")). 
It is incontrovertible that, in the course of terminating Plaintiff, Defendants Hyde 
and Erickson acted wholly within the scope of their authority. As SWC's Group CEO 
and President, respectively, Hyde and Erickson were responsible for the operation of that 
entity. Decisions regarding hiring and firing, and taking action in general with regard to 
personnel, are part of the way in which management implements its duties and 
accomplishes the goals of the company. Similarly obvious is that the conduct in question 
Indeed, even where a defendant engages in fraudulent behavior, his conduct can still be 
within the scope of employment. In Wardley Better Homes and Gardens v. Cannon, 
2002 UT 99, If 26, 61 P.3d 1009, 1017, the court held that: "Scope of authority 'refers to 
those acts which are so closely connected with what the servant is employed to do, and so 
fairly and reasonably incidental to it, that they may be regarded as methods, even though 
quite improper ones, of carrying out the objectives of employment.' (Citations omitted, 
emphasis added.) Accordingly, 'an agent does not cease to act within the course of his 
employment merely because he engages in a fraud upon a third person; it is of no 
consequence that he is deceiving the principal along with the third person.'" Id. 
(Citations omitted, emphasis added.) 
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occurred within the hours of the employee's work and ordinary spatial boundaries of the 
employment. 
Third, whether a plaintiff has established that a defendant's motive in terminating 
the plaintiff is purely personal is one that can be decided on a motion for summary 
judgment. As the Utah Supreme Court held in Christensen v. Swenson, 874 P.2d 125, 
127 (Utah 1994): "[W]hen the employee's activity is so clearly within or outside the 
scope of employment that reasonable minds cannot differ, the court may decide the issue 
as a matter of law." 
Here, the trial court easily reached the conclusion that "there is no evidence to 
establish that the termination of the plaintiff was based solely on a personal motivation by 
either Erickson or Hyde." (R. 3736) (emphasis added). Indeed, the record below 
overwhelmingly established that Plaintiffs termination was in furtherance of SWC's 
interests. Hyde's deposition testimony made clear that his dissatisfaction with Plaintiff 
was based on a variety of performance-based issues including that: 1) Plaintiff was not 
active enough in driving revenue and closing deals for the company; 2) Plaintiff was not 
sufficiently familiar with SWC's products; 3) some of the salespeople had complained 
about Plaintiff; and 4) Plaintiff was not effective in promoting SWC's products, 
motivating and training the sales organization, dealing with customers, helping to close 
deals, and interacting with team members. (R. 3680 f^ 18). In contemporaneous email 
communications with Erickson, Hyde raised a host of concerns he had regarding 
Plaintiffs performance: 
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[T]he four issues that I want to speak to with Steve are the 
following: 1) Hitting our revenue targets. This does not 
mean actively reporting on forecasts and pipelines. It means 
driving revenue and getting the job done. I look to the vp of 
sales as the one who ultimately puts the rock on his back and 
carries it. He has to be actively DRIVING revenue and 
taking ownership of the goals and making it happen. He 
needs to know how to get in and close deals not just manage 
and train reps. There is a big difference between the two. 2) 
Credibility and confidence with his sales people. Bottom line 
they are not responding well to his management style and 
process. They do not view him as someone who is helping 
them but rather is demanding a lot with not much in return. 
This is probably my biggest concern. 3) He is not creating a 
working relationship with the two people outside his 
organization that he needs the most. Phil Harker and Chad 
Gardner. He has alienated both. They have not readily 
accepted him either but he has not found a way to work with 
them and they need to be his biggest supporters. 4) He is 
viewed by many in SWC as a bully and they do not like 
working with him. This is again a style issue but is not 
serving him well. 
(R. 2753-54, 3684 If 20). On May 4, 2000, Hyde wrote to Erickson and reiterated his 
concerns regarding Plaintiff: 
For me all the warning signs are there right in front of us. 1) 
He has no credibility with his own representative. 2) He 
hasn't taken on a single deal and closed it in his 5 months 
with the company. 3) He has spent less than 20 days on the 
road in his first 5 months. 4) He still says he is coming up to 
speed on our products and knows less about them than the 
representatives. 5) He has alienated those that he needs the 
most (Chad, Troy, Phil). 6) People don't like working with 
him (Ami won't even talk to him unless she absolutely has 
to). 7) He has not taken ownership of the revenue numbers. 
8) He is not a leader he is a manager. 
(R. 2754, 36861f 21). 
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There is no evidence in the record that Hyde's sole motivation in communicating 
with Erickson regarding Plaintiffs performance was advancing Hyde's personal interest-
in fact, there is no evidence that this was even a part of his motivation. All of the 
evidence reflects that Hyde's concerns about Plaintiff were purely business related and 
plainly within the scope of Hyde's employment. To the extent that Plaintiff-like the 
plaintiff in Lichtie-has hypothesized that he was made a "scapegoat" to divert blame 
from Hyde, there is simply no record support for this invention. Although Plaintiff 
deposed Robert Greifeld, Hyde's supervisor at the time, there is no testimony from 
Greifeld or any other witness suggesting that Hyde's position was ever in jeopardy or 
that, absent Plaintiffs termination, Hyde would have suffered repercussions from SWC's 
performance. In this respect, this case is even further removed from Lichtie where, as 
discussed in detail below, the court concluded that it was clear that the plaintiffs poor 
performance would have been detrimental to his superior's standing with the company. 
Erickson testified that his dissatisfaction with Plaintiff was based on concerns 
different from Hyde's, and culminated in Plaintiffs refusal to commit to any set of 
revenue targets by which he would be willing to be measured. More specifically, 
Erickson explained that, despite Hyde's dissatisfaction with Plaintiff, Erickson was 
prepared to retain Plaintiff if he would: 1) commit to specific revenue targets to be set by 
Plaintiff; and 2) devise a plan to accomplish the revenue goals. (R. 2755, 3686 If 22). By 
May 2000, Erickson was looking for a statement of confidence, direction and energy 
from Plaintiff. (R. 2755, 3686 \ 22). Plaintiffs failure to agree to a concrete set of 
revenue goals or articulate a plan, coupled with his admission that he simply did not 
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know what to do to meet such goals, ultimately caused Erickson to terminate Plaintiff 
(after Plaintiff turned down two alternative job proposals). (R. 2755, 3687 ][ 23). 
Plainly, the record offers no support for the proposition that Erickson acted outside 
the scope of his authority or that his sole motivation for terminating Plaintiff was to 
advance Erickson's personal interest. Moreover, as in Lichtie, Plaintiff has had 
"adequate time to discover facts regarding [the defendants'] motivation in terminating 
[him], but [has] not come forward with sufficient evidence to enable a reasonable jury to 
rule in [his] favor on that essential element." Lichtie, 655 F. Supp. at 1028 n.l. The facts 
in this case are even more compelling than those presented in Lichtie, where the court 
granted defendant's motion for summary judgment on a claim of tortious interference 
involving remarkably similar allegations. The plaintiffs in Lichtie alleged that Walter 
Wood, the president of the Interstate Division of Defendant U.S. Home Corporation 
("U.S. Home"), "wrongfully, intentionally, and maliciously induced and persuaded" U.S. 
Home to terminate their employment. 655 F. Supp at 1027. Plaintiffs alleged that Wood, 
in order to save his own job, and acting outside the scope of his authority, persuaded 
Defendant Larry Kelly, an employee of U.S. Home, to interview various employees of 
U.S. Home whom Wood knew had a grudge against Plaintiff Joseph Lichtie in evaluating 
Lichtie's performance. Id. Plaintiffs further alleged that Wood thereby controlled 
Kelly's investigation, which resulted in a false impression of Joseph Lichtie's 
performance and the creation of plaintiffs as "scapegoats" for Wood's inadequacies -
thus saving Wood's job. Id. at 1027-28. 
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On Wood's motion for summary judgment, the court quickly concluded that as 
"president of the Interstate Division, [Wood] had authority to request that Kelly 
investigate the performance of Joseph Lichtie." Id. at 1027-28. Citing Section 235 of the 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, the court relied on the proposition that once it is 
determined that the agent is doing the type of work he is authorized to perform, there is 
an inference that the agent is working within the scope of his employment: 
If...the servant...does the kind of act which he is authorized 
to perform within working hours and at an authorized place, 
there is an inference that he is acting with the scope of 
employment. 
Id. 
The Lichtie court then addressed the second question in the analysis: whether 
"furthering [his own] personal interests" was Wood's "sole motive" in requesting the 
investigation. In opposing summary judgment, the plaintiffs in Lichtie argued that 
Wood's sole motivation was personal, citing as evidence Wood's statement that he 
believed it possible that if Joseph Lichtie were not terminated, Wood may himself have 
been terminated. Id. Wood testified in his deposition, however, that "he believed it was 
in the best interest of U.S. Home for Joseph and Michael Lichtie to be terminated," 
acknowledging that he was "accountable for the overall operation." Id. The court, citing 
Section 236 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, while recognizing that "it is 
clear that poor performance by Joseph Lichtie would be detrimental to Wood's standing 
with U.S. Home," concluded that based on the evidence, "a jury could not properly 
conclude that Wood's sole motivation was personal interest." Id. (emphasis in original) 
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Therefore, defendant was entitled to summary judgment on the claim for tortious 
interference. Id. 
Plaintiffs self-serving allegations that Hyde and Erickson were part of some 
sweeping conspiracy to blame Plaintiff for their own failings find no support in the 
record. As in Lichtie, such unsupported accusations cannot overcome a motion for 
summary judgment. The trial court's ruling in this respect was proper and should be 
affirmed. 
V. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANTS THEIR 
ATTORNEY'S FEES WHERE THEY SUCCESSFULLY DEFENDED 
AGAINST PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS; UNDER UTAH'S RECIPROCITY 
STATUTE, DEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED TO FEES. 
Under Utah law, where there is a right to attorney's fees in a written contract or 
other writing and the provisions of the written document allow at least one party to 
recover attorney's fees, the other party is entitled to fees under Utah's reciprocity statute, 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-56.5; Bilanzich v. Lonetti, 2007 UT 26, 163 P.3d 728 (Utah 
2007). 
In Bilanzich, the plaintiff filed an action seeking to have a personal guaranty 
provided to the defendants declared unenforceable due to the nonoccurrence of a 
condition precedent to the guaranty. Bilanzich had made the personal guaranty of a 
secured promissory note evidencing a loan by the defendants to REI. The guaranty 
included a unilateral provision that granted to the defendants any "costs, expenses and 
attorney's fees incurred in collection of the [underlying] Note and realization of the 
security." 2007 UT 26, If 4. The lower court ruled for Bilanzich, holding that the 
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guaranty was unenforceable but denied Bilanzich's attempt to obtain his attorney's fees 
pursuant to 78-27-56.5 and the terms of the guaranty. Id. f^ 6. The Utah Supreme Court 
reversed, holding that the lower court "may award attorney's fees and costs to Bilanzich 
as the prevailing party because the litigation was based on a writing that granted 
attorney's fees to at least one of the parties in the litigation." Id. \ 16. The court rejected 
the defendants' argument that the guaranty, not the underlying note (referenced as the 
basis for an award of fees to defendants) was at issue, stating: 
This attempt to draw such a fine distinction fails because it ignores 
the fact that a personal guaranty does not exist in a vacuum. The 
guaranty extends liability under the note, and an action to enforce 
the guaranty is necessarily an attempt to collect on the obligation 
under the note. 
A/. If 16 n. 5. 
Thus this Court looked at the full picture of the claims involved in the litigation in 
determining that a right to attorney's fees in one document in the litigation should be 
reciprocal as to other parties where the document is integral in resolving the claims. 
Attorney's fees are authorized in this case under the SWC Employment 
Agreement. (R. 4157-4160). Specifically, section 7.3 provides: 
In the event either party defaults in any of the terms or provisions of 
this Agreement the non-defaulting party shall be entitled to recover its, 
his or her reasonable attorney's fees and costs incurred, whether or not 
suit is commenced or final judgment obtained. 
(R.4160). 
Such fee provisions should not be construed narrowly. See, e.g. Clegg v. Lee, 516 
P.2d 348, 353 (Utah 1973) (Utah Supreme Court ruled defendant entitled to attorney's 
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fees where it "sought to avoid and not to enforce the contract" although fee provision 
provided fees for nondefaulting party); accord Dejavue, Inc. v. U.S. Energy Corp., 993 
P.2d 222, 226 (Utah Ct. App. 1999) (where agreement provided for fees "in the event of 
default by Dejavue," Dejavue "entitled to award of attorney's fees if it indeed prevailed 
on either its own breach of contract claim, or in defending against. . . breach of contract 
counterclaim"). "Utah courts have allowed the party who successfully prosecuted or 
defended against a claim to recover the fees attributable to those claims on which the 
party was successful." Occidental/Nebraska Fed. Savings Bank v. Nehr, 791 P.2d 217, 
221 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (emphasis added). 
The parties' briefing on the attorney's fees issue was completed before this Court 
issued the Bilanzich decision.13 The trial court, without the benefit of the Bilanzich 
reasoning, concluded that Defendants failed to provide any case law or statute which 
"supports their position that a non-defaulting party is equivalent to a prevailing party 
when the terms of the contract specifically provide that the non-defaulting party is 
entitled to recover their fees." (R. 4435). In making this determination, the trial court 
concluded that there was a "clear distinction between the terms 'default' and 'prevail' as 
defined by Black's Law Dictionary (prevailing party is "a party in whose judgment is 
rendered" and prevail is "to obtain the relief sought in an action"). (R. 4434). 
11 Apparently the defendant did not argue and/or the Court of Appeals did not consider 
the Bilanzich decision in a more recent case, Papanikolas Bros. Enter, v. Wendy's Old 
Fashioned Hamburgers of New York, 2007 UT App. 211, 163 P.3d 728. 
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There was no dispute that Defendants were the prevailing party but the trial court 
concluded that because Plaintiff was "not a defaulting party," Defendants were not 
entitled to fees. (R. 4434). Under the trial court's ruling, unless Defendants sued 
Plaintiff for breach of the SWC Employment Agreement or for a declaratory judgment 
enforcing the at-will provision of the agreement, as opposed to relying on it to 
successfully defend against Plaintiffs claims, they cannot recover attorney's fees. 
Bilanzich reconciles this inconsistency. 
Defendants respectfully request that this Court reverse the trial court's ruling that 
the SWC Employment Agreement did not provide for attorney's fees to Defendants and 
remand for the court to consider the remaining arguments.14 
VI. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANTS' ENTIRE 
REQUEST FOR COSTS. 
Defendants were entitled to their costs under Rule 54(d) and Section 7.3 of the 
SWC Employment Agreement. The trial court incorrectly held that (i) Rule 54(d) did not 
provide for costs other than the $55.00 the court awarded for witness fees and (2) Rule 
7.3 of the Employment Agreement was inapplicable. (R. 4456-58). 
The trial court did not reach the issue of whether Defendants are entitled to fees 
relating to defending against all of Plaintiffs claims. Every one of Plaintiffs claims 
involves his employment relationship, which, in turn, is inextricably tied to his 
employment agreement. (R. 4148-4175; 4356-4374); see also, Keith Jorgensen's, Inc. v. 
Ogden City Mall Co., 26 P.3d 872, 889 (Utah Ct. App. 2001) ("[Pjarties are entitled to 
fees when compensable and non-compensable claims overlap."); Dejavue, 993 P.2d at 
227 (when multiple claims "involving a common core of acts and related legal theories" 
are brought and a party prevails, that party is entitled to "compensation for all attorney's 
fees reasonably incurred in the litigation."). The trial court also did not address the 
reasonableness of Defendants' fee request. (R. 4356-4374). 
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A. The Trial Court Erred in Holding Defendants' Costs Were Not 
Necessary Under Rule 54(d). 
Rule 54(d) provides that costs are awarded as a matter of course to the prevailing 
party and requires that the trial court assess costs based on a verified memorandum. 
UTAH R. Civ. P. 54(d). Awardable costs include deposition costs that are taken in good 
faith and necessary for the development and presentation of the case. Frampton v. 
Wilson, 605 P.2d 771, 774 (Utah 1980); see also, Highland Const. Co. v. Union Pacific 
Railroad Co., 683 P.2d 1042, 1052 (Utah 1984). Even though the trial court found the 
depositions were taken in good faith, it did not find the deposition costs were necessary. 
(R. 4456-58). 
Defendants' Verified Memorandum of Costs requested total costs of $13,329.56. 
(R. 4378-4382). Of that amount, $11,289.96 was for deposition costs for ten individuals; 
the remaining $2,039.60 consisted of photocopy costs, Westlaw charges and witness fees. 
(R. 4347-4382).15 The trial court denied Defendants' request for deposition costs, 
finding that even though they were taken in good faith, Defendants did not establish that 
the extensive length of the Plaintiffs deposition was essential because (i) Plaintiffs 
deposition went over seven different sessions; (ii) Defendants did not establish that the 
extensive length of Plaintiff s deposition was essential for the development of the case; 
and (iii) there was no method to parse out what portion of costs may be essential for 
presentation of the case. (R. 4457; 4379). 
Defendants appeal only the denial of deposition costs under Rule 54(d) but appeal the 
denial of all costs under the SWC Employment Agreement. 
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The trial court's determination was incorrect. Plaintiff filed a Complaint which 
contained six causes of action, ultimately seeking about $12 Million in damages. (58-98; 
4400-4408). Because of the factual nature of the claims (e.g., fraud in the inducement, 
defamation and interference with employment relations), the depositions were critical to 
understanding the factual predicate of each cause of action and allowed Defendants to 
successfully move for dismissal of every one of Plaintiffs claims except one that was 
voluntarily dismissed. On his defamation claim alone, Plaintiff testified regarding 31 
allegedly defamatory statements (R. 2755-2763) after he created a written summary of 
the alleged defamatory statements which then became the subject of questioning. (R. 
4410-15). Plaintiff himself had to continue depositions over multiple days to obtain all 
the necessary information. (R. 4379—Erickson and Gardner deposition continued over 
two-three days). 
Additionally, the trial court failed to recognize the length of Plaintiff s deposition 
was due in large part to his obstructionist behavior. Plaintiff was deposed over seven 
sessions because of his style of responding, including his giving long, speech-like 
answers, which further prolonged the deposition. (R. 4416-4420). Persistent questioning 
was required to elicit the information from Plaintiff; there was no less-expensive means 
to obtain this information. Similarly, Plaintiffs piecemeal production of information and 
documents, as evidenced by no less than eight supplemental disclosures, required 
continuation of his deposition.(R. 2558-59). 
Finally, the trial court failed to address why costs were not allowed for the other 
nine depositions and failed to ask either party to apportion alleged unnecessary from 
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necessary deposition costs—something that could have been done. For these reasons, the 
trial court unreasonably failed to recognize that depositions costs were necessary. 
B. The Trial Court Erred in Denying Defendants an Award of Costs 
Based on the SWC Employment Agreement. 
The trial court denied Defendants' cost request under the SWC Employment 
Agreement for the same reason that it denied the attorney's fees request-it concluded that 
the attorney's fees and cost provision was inapplicable. (R. 4456-58). Should this Court 
determine that Section 7.3 of the Agreement provides for attorney's fees {see supra 
section V), Defendants will also be entitled to the costs referenced in the Verified 
Memorandum and the additional cost of Defendants' expert fee, which was necessarily 
incurred to address the analysis and conclusions raised by Plaintiffs expert witness and 
to opine on other, critical issues related to the damages Plaintiff sought. (R. 4427-29 f 
3). Since costs under Section 7.3 should have been rewarded regardless of whether suit 
was commenced or final judgment obtained, any costs incurred by Defendants in 
defending against Plaintiffs claims were allowable under the Agreement and are not 
limited by Rule 54(d). Chase v. Scott, 38 P.3d 1001, 1006 (Utah Ct. App. 2001). 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, Defendants respectfully request that Plaintiffs 
appeal be denied in its entirety, thereby affirming the decisions of the trial court; that this 
Court reverse the trial court's decision denying Defendants their costs and attorney's 
fees; and grant Defendants their costs and fees incurred in this appeal. 
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C 
Litster v. Alza Corp. 
D.Utah,2006. 
Only the Westlaw citation is currently available. 
United States District Court,D. Utah,Central Divi-
sion. 
Megan LITSTER, et a l , Plaintiffs, 
v. 
ALZA CORP, et al., Defendants. 
No. 2:05-CV-1077 TS. 
Nov. 15,2006. 
George T. Waddoups, Nancy A. Mismash, Robert 
J. Debry & Associates, Salt Lake City, UT, for 
Plaintiffs. 
John A. Anderson, Stoel Rives, Salt Lake City, UT, 
Michael C. Zellers, Mollie F. Benedict, Tucker El-
lis & West, Los Angeles, CA, for Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 
DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO AMEND 
TED STEWART, District Judge. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
*1 This matter comes before the Court on a 
Motion to Amend.FN1 Plaintiffs seeks leave of the 
Court to amend their complaint to add Johnson and 
Johnson ("J & J"), the parent corporation of the 
other named Defendants, under Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a). 
Specifically, Plaintiffs state that "[s]ince [the ori-
ginal filing] the parties have engaged in discovery 
and it appears that the plaintiffs have a factual and 
legal basis for an additional claim."Plaintiffs, in ef-
fect, seek to incorporate J & J into its existing 
claims of wrongful death, negligent misrepresenta-
tion, fraud and deceit, and for punitive damages re-
lated to allegedly defective drug patches. 
FNl.DocketNo. 15. 
II. DISCUSSION 
© 2008 Thomson/West. No 
Page 1 
J & J opposes Plaintiffs' motion, claiming that 
amendment would be futile for two reasons: (A) 
there is no personal jurisdiction over J & J as to any 
claim, and the claims are therefore subject to dis-
missal under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(2), and (B) even if 
there were personal jurisdiction, the two year stat-
utes of limitations FN2 for Plaintiffs' wrongful 
death claims have run, and Plaintiffs cannot prop-
erly relate back the proposed amended complaint 
under Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(c). Under this latter scen-
ario, Plaintiffs' claims would then be subject to a 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) dismissal. 
FN2.Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-24. 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(c) states that leave to amend 
"shall be freely given when justice so re-
quires."However, leave to amend is not warranted 
when the filing of an amended complaint would be 
futile.FN3A proposed amendment is futile if it can-
not survive a motion to dismiss.FN4 
FN3.Frank v West, Inc, 3 F.3d 1357, 
1365 (10th Cir.1993). 
FN4 Jefferson County Sch Dist No R-l v 
Moody's Investor's Servs., 175 F.3d 848, 
859 (10th Cir. 1999). 
A. Personal Jurisdiction 
J & J argues that there is no personal jurisdic-
tion over it in this action, and has attached the affi-
davit of Douglas Chia, the Assistant Secretary of J 
& J, to support this assertion. 
"The ... court is given discretion in determining 
the procedure to employ in considering a motion to 
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.... Facts regarding 
jurisdictional questions may be determined by ref-
erence to affidavits [,] evidentiary hearing[,] tri-
al[,]"FN5 or "jurisdictional discovery" where "facts 
are controverted or a more satisfactory showing of 
the facts is necessary."FN6"When the evidence 
presented on the motion to dismiss consists of affi-
im to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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davits and other written materials, the plaintiff need 
only make a prima facie showing."FN7"The allega-
tions in the complaint must be taken as true to the 
extent they are uncontroverted by the defendant's 
affidavits. If the parties present conflicting affi-
davits, all factual disputes are resolved in the 
plaintiffs favor...."FN8 
FN5. Fed. Deposit 
Apartments, 959 
Cir.1992). 
Ins. Corp. 
F.2d 170, 
v. Oaklawn 
174 (10th 
FN6. World Wide Ass'n of Specialty Pro-
grams and Schs. v. Houlahan, No 04-4181, 
2005 WL 1097321, at *3 (10th Cir. May 
10, 2005). 
FN7.£e// Helicopter Textron, Inc. v. Heli-
qwest Int'l, Ltd., 385 F.3d 1291, 1295 
(10thCir.2004). 
FN8.Kennedy v. Freeman, 
128 (10th Cir. 1990). 
919 F.2d 126, 
" 'To obtain personal jurisdiction over a non-
resident defendant in a diversity action, a plaintiff 
must show that jurisdiction is legitimate under the 
laws of the forum state and that the exercise of jur-
isdiction does not offend the due process clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.' " FN9 "It is frequently 
helpful to undertake the due process analysis first, 
because any set of circumstances that satisfies due 
process will also satisfy the long-arm statute." FN 10 
¥N9.Soma Med. Int'l v. Standard 
Chartered Bank, 196 F.3d 1292, 1295 
(10th Cir. 1999) (quoting Far West Capital, 
Inc. v. Towne, 46 F.3d 1071, 1074 (10th 
Cir. 1995)). 
FNIO-Sys. Designs, Inc. v. New Custom-
ward Co., 248 F.Supp.2d 1093, 1097 
(D.Utah 2003). 
*2 To satisfy the constitutional requirement of 
due process there must be "minimum contacts" 
between the defendant and the forum 
state.FN1'The "minimum contacts" standard may 
be met by a finding of either general jurisdiction or 
specific jurisdiction. For general jurisdiction to ex-
ist, " 'the defendant must be conducting substantial 
and continuous local activity in the forum state.' " 
FN 12 A number of factors are relevant to the issue 
of whether general personal jurisdiction exists, in-
cluding whether the defendant is: (1) engaged in 
business in this state; (2) licensed to do business in 
this state; (3) owning, leasing, or controlling prop-
erty or assets in this state; (4) maintaining employ-
ees, offices, agents, or bank accounts in this state; 
(5) shareholders reside in this state; (6) maintaining 
phone or fax listings within this state; (7) advert-
ising or soliciting business in this state; (8) travel-
ing to this state by way of salespersons; (9) paying 
taxes in this state; (10) visiting potential customers 
in this state; (11) recruiting employees in the state; 
and (12) generating a substantial percentage of its 
national sales through revenue generated from in-
state customers.™13 
FN11. World-Wide Volkswagen Co. v. 
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291 (1980). 
FNU.Soma, 196 F.3d at 1295 (quoting Ar-
guello v. Woodworking Mack Co., 838 
P.2d 1120, 1122 (Utah 1992)). 
FN 13.Id at 1295-96 (citing Buddensick v 
Stateline Hotel, Inc, 972 P.2d 928, 930-31 
(Utah Ct.App. 1998)). 
Plaintiffs' proposed amended complaint asserts 
J & J does business, has an actual or constructive 
presence, solicits business, and actively markets 
and sells the product at issue in the case in the State 
of Utah. Plaintiffs also argue that there is such 
unity of interest between J & J and the other named 
defendants that all entities have become the alter-
ego of one another. 
J & J, through the Chia Affidavit, counters that 
it does no business in Utah, has no offices in Utah, 
solicits no business in Utah, owns no property in 
© 2008 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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Utah, employs no employees or agents in Utah, is 
not registered to conduct business in Utah, and does 
not sell, manufacture, or market any product in 
Utah or any other state. Moreover, J & J details its 
independence from its wholly owned subsidiaries 
by asserting that it has a different board of directors 
and officers, is financially independent from De-
fendants, and is not involved in the day-to-day op-
erations of the other named defendants. J & J states 
that it is merely a holding company for its owned 
subsidiaries. 
Plaintiffs do not set forth any affidavits of their 
own, and largely ignore the evidence raised by the 
Chia Affidavit. Nonetheless, as it relates to general 
jurisdiction, Plaintiff requests the Court to grant it 
the opportunity to conduct jurisdictional discovery. 
Plaintiffs cite sources which broadly characterize J 
& J's national advertising expenses, and assert that, 
given the opportunity, they could discover advert-
ising directed to the Utah market. However, 
Plaintiffs' broad assertions regarding J & J's nation-
al advertising are not sufficient to demonstrate a 
factual issue as to general jurisdiction here. Regard-
ing Plaintiffs' alter ego theory, while it is true that 
u[c]ompanies conducting business through their 
subsidiaries can qualify as transacting business in a 
state, provided the parent exercises sufficient con-
trol over the subsidiary[,]"FN14 Plaintiffs have 
pointed to no evidence of control by J & J over its 
subsidiaries to establish a factual issue. Accord-
ingly, the Court is unconvinced there is any factual 
issue with regard to general jurisdiction, or that jur-
isdictional discovery would allow Plaintiffs to pro-
duce sufficient evidence on the matter of general 
personal jurisdiction to survive a motion to dismiss. 
There is simply no evidence here of substantial and 
continuous local activity by J & J in the forum state. 
FN 14. Pro Axess, Inc. v. Or lux Distribu-
tion, Inc., 428 F.3d 1270, 1278 (10th 
Cir.2005). 
*3 Plaintiffs further fail to demonstrate factual 
issues as to specific jurisdiction. When a 
© 2008 Thomson/West. No 
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"defendant has 'purposely directed' his activities at 
residents of the forum," courts in that state may ex-
ercise specific jurisdiction in cases that "arise out 
of or relate to those activities."FN,5In order for the 
Court to find specific jurisdiction, there must be 
"some act by which the defendant purposefully 
avails of the privilege of conducting activities with-
in the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and 
protections of its laws."FN16 
FN 15.Burger King v Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 
462,472-73(1985). 
¥N\6.Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 
253 (1958) (citation omitted). 
Plaintiffs' proposed amended complaint asserts 
that J & J manufactured, sold, distributed, pro-
moted, and placed in the stream of commerce the 
drug product at issue. However, the Chia Affidavit 
asserts that J & J, as a holding company, manufac-
tures or distributes no products. Plaintiffs again fail 
to address the assertions in the Chia Affidavit, but 
has asked for jurisdictional discovery on the issue 
of specific jurisdiction. 
To attempt to show that discovery would be 
fruitful, Plaintiffs cite several past or ongoing court 
cases in Utah in which J & J is a party. However, 
Plaintiffs fail to establish, or even argue, how those 
contacts are related in any way to its proposed 
amended claims against J & J in this 
ease.FNl7Plaintiffs also assert that jurisdictional 
discovery could produce evidence to establish min-
imum contacts in this case because J & J maintains 
interactive websites for health care professionals 
which both provide information and allow such per-
sons to order and track shipping of J & J products. 
However, the provision of information is passive 
activity, and Plaintiffs fail to provide any evidence 
of whether the drug product at issue in this case 
may even be obtained over such sites. Accordingly, 
Plaintiffs have failed to establish that there is a fac-
tual issue as to specific personal jurisdiction which 
would merit this Court granting jurisdictional dis-
covery. Plaintiffs have not met their burden of suf-
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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ficiently establishing minimum contacts by J & J in 
this action. Therefore, Plaintiffs' proposed amend-
ment would be subject to dismissal under 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Because there are no factual 
issues as to minimum contacts, the Court need not 
address traditional notions of fair play and substan-
tial justice. 
FN 17."[A] court may ... assert specific jur-
isdiction over a nonresident defendant if 
the defendant has 'purposefully directed' 
his activities at residents of the form, and 
the litigation results from alleged injuries 
that 'arise out of or relate to' those activit-
ies."0M7 Holdings, Inc. v. Royal Ins. Co. 
of Canada, 149 F.3d 1086, 1090 (10th 
Cir.1998) (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. 
at 472). 
B. Relation Back 
Plaintiffs do not contest that the statutes of lim-
itations have run as to the wrongful death claims, 
but argue only that relation back would be proper. 
An amendment adding a new party relates back to 
the date of the original complaint only when all 
three of the following are satisfied: (1) the amended 
complaint involves the same transaction or occur-
rence as the original complaint; (2) the new party 
had notice of the action and therefore suffers no 
prejudice; and (3) the new party knew or should 
have known that, but for a mistake concerning the 
identity of the proper party, the action would have 
been brought against the party.FN18 
FN18.Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(c); Garrett v. Flem-
ing, 362 F.3d 692, 696 (10th Cir.2004). 
J & J argues that a mistake concerning the 
identity of a proper party, as contemplated by the 
rule, has not occurred here. J & J properly points 
out that a lack of knowledge by Plaintiffs is not a 
mistake in identity of a proper party of which J & J 
should have been aware. More specifically, when 
Plaintiffs state that "it appears that the plaintiffs 
have a factual and legal basis for an additional 
© 2008 Thomson/West. No 
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claim," they are not stating that they have made a 
mistake in identifying the proper party in this ac-
tion. Rather, Plaintiffs appear to assert that because 
they have learned some additional information in 
discovery, they would like to add another party to 
their claims, and, at the same time, avoid the im-
plications of the statutes of limitations as it relates 
to that party. This is not the type of mistake con-
templated by Rule 15.FN19 
FN\9.See, e.g., Nelson v. Adams USA, 
Inc., 529 U.S. 460, 467 n. 1 (2000) 
(reasoning that no mistake when Plaintiff 
knew of role and existence of party sought 
to be added before seeking to amend its 
pleadings); Garrett v. Fleming, 362 F.3d 
692, 696-97 (10th Cir.2004) (holding that a 
plaintiffs lack of knowledge of the inten-
ded defendant's identity is not a mistake 
concerning the identity of the proper 
party); In re Estate of Kout v. United 
States, 241 F.Supp.2d 1183, 1191-92 
(D.Kan.2002) (holding that plaintiffs fail-
ure to name a doctor as a defendant was 
based on lack of knowledge, not mistake, 
where plaintiff mistook the status of the 
known party, rather than its identity). 
*4 While Plaintiffs cite the Travelers Indemnity 
Co. v. United States ex rel. Construction 
SpecialtiesFN20 case for the proposition that entit-
ies which have an identity of interest may be prop-
erly added under Fed.R.Civ.P. 15, Plaintiffs do not 
address the distinction between lack of knowledge 
and mistake of identity. Moreover, the instant case 
may be distinguished from Travelers in that there, 
unlike here: a clearly incorrect party for the claim 
asserted was originally named; the mistakenly 
named parent corporation sat on the knowledge of 
the mistake until the applicable statute of limita-
tions ran; the improperly named parent corporation 
and sought-to-be-substituted subsidiary shared of-
fice space, managers, and directors; and substitu-
tion, not addition of, parties was requested by the 
plaintiff.FN21 Plaintiffs' arguments are therefore in-
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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apposite, and amendment to include J & J in the 
wrongful death claims would be futile, subject to a 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, and there-
fore, is not warranted. 
FN20.382 F.2d 103 (10th Cir.1967), 
FN2Ud at 105-06. 
III. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, Plaintiffs' Motion will be denied 
because: (1) Plaintiff has failed to controvert J & J's 
affidavit, and has not sufficiently established factu-
al issues as to general or specific subject matter jur-
isdiction as to any claims, and (2) because Plaintiffs 
did not mistake the identity of a proper defendant, 
they are not entitled to relate their wrongful death 
claims back to their original filing, thus avoiding 
the now-expired statute of limitations. It is there- fore 
ORDERED that Plaintiffs Motion to Amend 
(Docket No. 15) is DENIED. 
D.Utah,2006. 
Litster v. Alza Corp. 
Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2006 WL 3327906 
(D.Utah) 
END OF DOCUMENT 
> 2008 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
https://web2.westlawxom/print/pri^ 2/29/2008 
Wtetlavv, 
Slip Copy 
Slip Copy, 2007 WL 1577671 (D.Utah) 
(Cite as: Slip Copy) 
Page 1 
McNeill v. Geostar 
D.Utah,2007. 
Only the Westlaw citation is currently avail-
able.Larry McNEILL, Plaintiff, 
v. 
GEOSTAR, First Source Wyoming, and Gastar Ex-
ploration Limited, Defendants. 
No.2:06-CV-911TS. 
May 29, 2007. 
Daniel L. Berman, Kenneth W. Yeates, Kyle C. 
Thompson, Berman & Savage PC, Salt Lake City, 
UT, for Plaintiff. 
Matthew L. Lalli, Peter H. Donaldson, Snell & 
Wilmer, Jennifer Anderson Whitlock, Robert M. 
Anderson, Van Cott Bagley Cornwall & McCarthy, 
Salt Lake City, UT, Benjamin F.S. Elmore, James 
D. Thompson, III, Vinson & Elkins LLP, Houston, 
TX, for Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 
GRANTING DEFENDANT GASTAR'S MOTION 
TO DISMISS AND DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MO-
TION FOR LEAVE TO FILE SUPPLEMENTAL 
MEMORANDUM 
STEWART. 
*1 This matter is before the Court on Defend-
ant Gastar's Motion to Dismiss FNI and Plaintiffs 
Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Memor-
andum in Opposition to Defendant Gastar's Motion 
to Dismiss.FN2This matter was set for hearing on 
May 22, 2007; however, the hearing was stricken 
because the Court determined that oral argument 
would not facilitate the resolution of the issues be-
fore it. Having reviewed the submissions of the 
parties, and being otherwise fully informed, the 
Court will grant Defendant Gastar's Motion to Dis-
miss, and deny Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to File 
Supplemental Memorandum, as set forth more fully 
below. 
FNI.Docket No. 10. 
FN2.Docket No. 37. 
I. BACKGROUND 
Plaintiff brought this action against Defendants 
GeoStar, First Source Wyoming,™3 and Gastar 
Exploration Limited on October 25, 2006.FN4The 
Complaint alleges five causes of action,™5 only 
the fifth of which names Gastar-for declaratory 
judgment, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201 and Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-33-1, et seq. 
FN3. On January 19, 2007, Defendants 
Geostar and First Source Wyoming filed 
their Answer and Counterclaim against 
Plaintiffs. Docket No. 13. 
FN4.Docket No. 1. 
FN5. Against GeoStar, Plaintiff claims 
breach of contract, conversion of share of 
stock and declaratory judgment. Against 
First Source Wyoming, Plaintiff alleges 
breach of contract. SeeDocket No. 1. 
Defendant Gastar filed the instant Motion to 
Dismiss on January 19, 2007, alleging that the 
Court lacks personal jurisdiction over Gastar, and, 
alternatively, that Plaintiff has failed to state a 
claim upon which relief can be granted, pursuant to 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). In response, Plaintiff re-
quests that the Court allow discovery on the issue 
of personal jurisdiction. FN6 
FN6.Docket No. 23, at 1-4. 
II. DISCUSSION 
A. DEFENDANT GASTAR'S MOTION TO DIS-
MISS 
As noted, Defendant Gastar moves to dismiss 
the Complaint against it on two grounds: 1) that the 
Court lacks personal jurisdiction-either specific or 
general-over it, and due process requires dismissal; 
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and 2) Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 
which relief can be granted under the Declaratory 
Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §2 201. Gastar also op-
poses Plaintiffs request for discovery on the issue 
of personal jurisdiction. The Court addresses each 
argument, in turn. 1. Personal Jurisdiction 
Plaintiff carries the burden of establishing per-
sonal jurisdiction over Defendant.FN7U T o obtain 
personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant 
in a diversity action, a plaintiff must show that jur-
isdiction is legitimate under the laws of the forum 
state and that the exercise of jurisdiction does not 
offend the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.' " FN8 "It is frequently helpful to un-
dertake the due process analysis first, because any 
set of circumstances that satisfies due process will 
also satisfy the long-arm statute." FN9 
FN7'.Kuenzle v. 
Freizeitgerdte AG, 
(10th Cir. 1996). 
HTM 
102 F.3d 
SportUnd 
453, 456 
FN&.Soma Med. Int'l v. Standard 
Chartered Bank, 196 F.3d 1292, 1295 
(10th Cir. 1999) (quoting Far West Capital, 
Inc. v. Towne, 46 F.3d 1071, 1074 (10th 
Cir. 1995)). 
FN9.Systems Designs, Inc. v. New Custom-
ward Co., 248 F.Supp.2d 1093, 1097 
(D.Utah 2003). 
To satisfy the constitutional requirement of due 
process there must be "minimum contacts" between 
the defendant and the forum state.FN,0"When the 
evidence presented on the motion to dismiss con-
sists of affidavits and other written materials, the 
plaintiff need only make a prima facie 
showing."FNll"The allegations in the complaint 
must be taken as true to the extent they are uncon-
troverted by the defendant's affidavits. If the parties 
present conflicting affidavits, all factual disputes 
are resolved in the plaintiffs favor...."FN12 
FN10.World-Wide Volkswagen Co. v. 
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291 (1980). 
FN W.Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. v. 
qwest Intern., Ltd., 385 F.3d 1291, 
(10thCir.2004). 
Heli-
1295 
FNXl.Kennedy v. Freeman, 919 F.2d 126, 
128 (10th Cir. 1990). 
*2 The "minimum contacts" stan dard may be 
met by a finding of either general jurisdiction or 
specific jurisdiction. In this case, Plaintiff asserts 
the Court has specific jurisdiction. When the 
"defendant has 'purposely directed' his activities at 
residents of the forum," courts in that state may ex-
ercise specific jurisdiction in cases that "arise out 
of or relate to those activities.'™3In order for the 
Court to find specific jurisdiction, there must be 
"some act by which the defendant purposefully 
avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities 
within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits 
and protections of its laws."FN14If the Court finds 
that the Defendant had adequate minimum contacts 
with the forum state, the Court must also determine 
that personal jurisdiction is reasonable in light of 
the circumstances surrounding the case, or, in other 
words, that exercising jurisdiction would not offend 
traditional notions of "fair play and substantial 
justice." FN15"Courts consider the following 
factors to decide whether exercise of jurisdiction is 
reasonable: (1) the burden on the defendant; (2) the 
forum state's interest in resolving the dispute; (3) 
the plaintiffs interest in receiving convenient and 
effective relief; (4) the interstate judicial system's 
interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of 
controversies; and (5) the shared interest of the sev-
eral states in furthering fundamental substantive 
policies."FN16 
FN 13.Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 
462,472-73(1985). 
FN14.Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 
253 (1958) (citation omitted). 
Ym*>.Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476. 
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¥N\6.Bell Helicopter, 385 F.3d at 1296. 
Gastar's supporting Affidavit of its President 
and CEO, J. Russell Porter FN17-which is entirely 
uncontroverted by Plaintiff-asserts the following 
jurisdictional facts: 
FN17.DocketNo. 15. 
• Gastar is organized and existing under the 
laws of Alberta, Canada. Gastar's principal place of 
business is located in Houston, Texas. Gastar does 
not have a designated agent for service of process 
in the State of Utah. 
• Gastar does not maintain an office in Utah. 
• Gastar does not have employees or agents 
regularly assigned to do business for it in the State 
of Utah. 
• Gastar has not been qualified or applied to be 
qualified to do business in the State of Utah. 
• Gastar has not contracted with any resident of 
Utah to perform any obligations in Utah. 
• Gastar has not committed any tort, in whole 
or in part, in the State of Utah. 
• Gastar has not owned, used or possessed any 
real property located in the State of Utah. 
• Gastar maintains no bank accounts in Utah 
and does not transact banking business in the States 
of Utah. 
• Gastar does not hold itself out as a Utah cor-
poration, and has never done so. Gastar does not 
market or advertise that it conducts operations in 
Utah, as its operations are limited to Texas, West 
Virginia, Wyoming, and Australia. FN18 
FN18.DocketNo. 12, at 6-7;Docket No. 15. 
In this case, Plaintiffs Complaint sets forth that 
Gastar is a Canadian corporation with its principal 
place of business if Houston, Texas. The facts be-
fore the Court further indicate that Gastar has no 
business, operational, marketing, or other presence 
in the State of Utah, and no contacts with the state. 
*3 Based upon the record before it, the Court 
© 2008 Thomson/West. No 
finds that it does not have personal jurisdiction over 
Defendant Gastar, and will grant its Motion to Dis-
miss thereon. 
2. Jurisdictional Discovery 
In response to the personal jurisdiction argu-
ment in Gastar's Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff re-
quests, in the alternative, that the Court "stay ruling 
on the motion until McNeill has been given the op-
portunity to conduct discovery on those issues ... 
which will provide a sufficient basis for this Court 
to rule properly on the jurisdictional issue."™19 
FN19.DocketNo. 23, at 6. 
The parties agree that the Court has discretion 
to grant discovery on the limited basis of personal 
jurisdiction.FN20Plaintiff cites an unpublished 
Tenth Circuit opinion for the proposition that "a re-
fusal to grant discovery constitutes an abuse of dis-
cretion if either the pertinent jurisdictional facts are 
controverted or a more satisfactory showing of the 
facts is necessary."FN21 However, Gastar counters 
that it is not an abuse of discretion when a plaintiff 
makes a general request for jurisdictional discovery 
in response to a motion to dismiss. Defendant also 
suggests that such a request should be made by a 
separate, supported motion, and not merely by a re-
sponsive assertion .FN22 
FN20.See World Wide Assn. of Specialty 
Programs & Schs. v. Houlahan, 138 
Fed.Appx. 50, 2005 WL 1097321 (10th 
Cir.2005) (unpublished opinion); Health 
Grades v. Decatur Memorial Hospital, 190 
Fed.Appx. 586, 589, 2006 WL 170 
1704454 (10th Cir.2006) (unpublished 
opinion). 
FN21.Health Grades, 190 Fed.Appx. at 589. 
FN22.Docket No. 27, at 3 (citing World 
Wide, 138 Fed.Appx. at 52). 
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Plaintiff argues that the Court should invoke its 
discretion and allow limited jurisdictional discov-
ery in this case because he has made a "colorable 
claim for personal jurisdiction" over 
Gastar.FN23To the contrary, the Court's ruling 
above demonstrates that Plaintiff has not made a 
colorable claim that this Court has personal juris-
diction over Gastar. 
FN23.DocketNo. 23, at 4. 
Moreover, the Court does not believe that juris-
dictional discovery in this case would be fruitful, 
because Plaintiff does not controvert the fact al-
leged by Gastar that it is not "doing business" in 
Utah, or that Gastar had no control over GeoStar's 
use or disposition of the share of Gastar common 
stock owned by Gastar. Indeed, Plaintiff does not 
assert that the Court has either general or specific 
personal jurisdiction over Gastar, but raises an 
"alter ego" theory to link Gastar to this case. 
However, the Court concurs with Gastar that 
"Plaintiffs claims, even if true, would not show the 
degree of control by GeoStar over Gastar necessary 
to give rise to jurisdiction over Gastar."FN24Fur-
ther, Utah law establishes that the existence of of-
ficers and directors in common does not constitute 
parental control of a subsidiary, or vice versa FN25 
and that financing agreements and stock ownership 
are not determinative of the issue.FN26 
FN24.Docket No. 27, at 7 (internal cita-
tions omitted). 
VN25.See Benton v. Cameco Corp, 375 
F.3d 1070, 1081 (10th Cir.2004). 
¥N26.See Lowell Staats Mining Co. v. Pi-
oneer Uravan, Inc. 878 F .2d 1259, 1264 
(10th Cir. 1989), McKinney v. Ga nnett Co, 
817 F.2d 659, 665-666 (10th Cir. 1987), 
and Luckett v. Bethlehem Steel Corp, 618 
F.2d 1373 (10th Cir. 1980). 
The Court agrees with Gastar that Plaintiff has 
not identified any controverted jurisdictional facts 
which would warrant jurisdictional discovery, and 
he may not rest on speculative or conclusory 
claims.FN27Plaintiffs broad assertions under an al-
ter ego theory are vague and conclusory-largely 
stated "upon information and belief'-and do not 
demonstrate factual disputes.™28 Nor does 
Plaintiff identify what discovery he seeks or why it 
would be fruitful to the precise issues before the 
Court. Therefore, the Court declines to allow dis-
covery on the limited issue of personal jurisdiction 
over Gastar in this matter. 
FN27.&K? Litster v. Aha Corp., 2006 WL 
3327906 (10th Cir.2006) (unpublished 
opinion). 
FN28.S«?A/. at*7-8. 
3. 12(b)(6) Failure to State a Claim-Actual Case or 
Controversy 
*4 Given the Court's ruling above on the issue 
of personal jurisdiction, the Court need not address 
Gastar's alternative ground for dismissal-that 
Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which re-
lief can be granted, for lack for a showing of an ac-
tual case of controversy. 
B. PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE 
SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM 
Likewise, given the Court's ruling above, the 
Court will deny Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to File 
Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to De-
fendant Gastar's Motion to Dismiss. The issue pro-
posed to be discussed therein is not relevant to the 
matter at hand, as it has not been raised by Defend-
ant at this juncture. However, if the claim of an ex-
clusive remedy, the Court may re-visit this issue. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Based upon the above, it is hereby 
ORDERED that the Court will not allow lim-
ited discovery regarding personal jurisdiction over 
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Gastar. It is further 
ORDERED that Defendant Gastar's Motion to 
Dismiss (Docket No. 10) is GRANTED, and 
Plaintiffs claims against Gastar are dismissed for 
lack of personal jurisdiction. It is further 
ORDERED that Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to 
File Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to 
Defendant Gastar's Motion to Dismiss is DENIED. 
However, if the claim of an exclusive remedy 
which was raised in the Motion becomes an issue in 
this case, the Court may re-visit this issue. 
SO ORDERED. 
D.Utah,2007. 
McNeill v. Geostar 
Slip Copy, 2007 WL 1577671 (D.Utah) 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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LILLARD. 
*1 This case involves the alleged breach of an 
employment contract. The plaintiff employee ar-
gued that a letter signed by him and the defendant 
employer created a five-year employment contract. 
The trial court found that the letter was an agree-
ment for employment for a five-year term, awarded 
the employee $62,235 for breach of contract, and 
required the employee to pay into court unemploy-
ment compensation benefits he received. The em-
ployer appeals. We reverse and remand. 
Plaintiff/Appellee Kerry Thompson 
("Thompson") started working for Defendant/Ap-
pellant Telco, Inc. ("Telco") on April 10, 1992 as a 
telephone repair technician. The parties executed a 
document entitled "Terms of Employment Agree-
ment between Kerry Thompson and Telco, Inc." on 
that date, which read: 
1) Telco will pay Kerry Thompson $10.00 per 
hour. 
© 2008 Thomson/West. No 
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2) Kerry will be guaranteed a minimum $1.00 
per hour raise per year over the next five (5) years. 
3) Two weeks paid vacation per year (July & 
December). 
4) Two bonuses per year of $600 each on June 
6th and Dec. 12th. 
5) Telco agrees to pay insurance for Kerry 
Thompson. Kerry will pay his own dependent in-
surance. 
6) Weekly work hours will be 40 Hours. Min-
imum Telco will allow will be 5-10 hours overtime 
per week as soon as demand requires it. 
The letter was signed by Thompson and by 
Gregory J. Wass ("Wass"). Wass was the manager 
of Telco's telephone repair center and Thompson's 
direct supervisor. Thompson worked for Telco until 
August 8, 1995. The termination letter from Telco 
dated August 9, 1995 states that Thompson was laid 
off "due to lack of work." Thompson received un-
employment benefits of approximately $5684. 
Thompson filed a lawsuit on October 1 1, 1995 
alleging breach of the letter agreement. He sought 
lost wages and benefits allegedly due him under the 
agreement. Telco's answer admitted the authenticity 
of the letter agreement but denied that it constituted 
a five-year employment contract. Telco maintained 
that Thompson was an at-will employee and that 
the agreement merely guaranteed a rate of com-
pensation if Thompson remained employed. Telco 
also raised several affirmative defenses, namely, 
that Thompson breached the agreement by failing 
to work forty hours a week and by failing to satis-
factorily perform his duties, that the termination 
letter was a valid accord and satisfaction, that 
Thompson was estopped from filing suit, and the 
statute of frauds. 
Both parties filed motions for summary judg-
ment. Telco filed affidavits of the management per-
sonnel at Telco, as well as numerous employee re-
cords. Thompson also filed several affidavits, in-
cluding his own. The trial court denied both mo-
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The bench trial commenced on November 6, 
1996. Thompson was the sole witness on November 
6 and was questioned extensively by his counsel 
and opposing counsel. Thompson testified about his 
employment at Telco. He denied requesting that his 
termination be characterized as for "lack of work" 
so that he could receive unemployment benefits. He 
admitted, however, that by putting lack of work as 
the reason for his termination, Telco made him eli-
gible for unemployment benefits. He also admitted 
that he received unemployment benefits. Although 
Thompson did not believe that he had done any-
thing for which Telco could terminate him, he ac-
knowledged that he was told that he was being ter-
minated for the reasons listed on the termination re-
port, including violations of the employee 
guidelines, unsatisfactory performance, and failure 
to work forty hours per week. 
*2 Thompson's counsel then closed his proof, 
after which counsel for Telco made a motion to dis-
miss the complaint. The trial court adjourned to 
consider the motion and read the parties' pre-trial 
briefs, which were not made part of the record on 
appeal. 
At the beginning of the next day of trial, the 
trial judge sua sponte entered an order finding that, 
in agreeing on "lack of work" as a cause for termin-
ation, the parties "may have" violated Tennessee 
Code Annotated § 50-7-709, which sets forth a 
criminal penalty for a misrepresentation in order to 
receive unemployment compensation.FN1The trial 
court ordered the county district attorney to invest-
igate the case. In addition, the trial court struck 
Telco's affirmative defense of accord and satisfac-
tion regarding the termination letter because the de-
fense was based on a fraudulent contract to obtain 
unemployment benefits and ordered Thompson to 
reimburse the Department of Employment Security 
for the amount of unemployment benefits he had re-
ceived, plus interest, within thirty days. The order 
also provided that if Thompson failed to remit the 
monies within thirty days, the trial court would dis-
© 2008 Thomson/West. No 
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miss the complaint. Court was then adjourned. 
There was no further testimony before court ad-
journed. 
FN 1.Tennessee Code Annotated § 
50-7-709 reads: 
Misrepresentation to obtain benefits-Penalty. 
(a) Whoever makes a false statement or repres-
entation knowing it to be false or knowingly fails to 
disclose a material fact, to obtain or increase any 
benefit or other payment under this chapter, either 
for himself or for any other person, commits a 
Class C misdemeanor; and each such false state-
ment or representation or failure to disclose a ma-
terial fact constitutes a separate offense. 
(b) All prosecutions for offenses defined by 
this section shall be commenced within two (2) 
years, next, after the commission of the offense. 
Tenn.Code Ann. § 50-7-709 (1991). 
Based on circumstances unrelated to the em-
ployment compensation, Thompson's counsel filed 
a motion for extension of time for dismissal of 
Plaintiffs case with a supporting affidavit on 
December 18, 1996. On that same day Thompson's 
counsel filed a motion to alter or amend, arguing 
that Telco, not Thompson, prepared the termination 
letter and thus should be responsible for reimburs-
ing the Department of Employment Security. The 
motion also requested permission for the funds to 
be paid to the clerk and master of the court until fi-
nal disposition of the case. Telco filed a response to 
Thompson's motion, denying that it violated Ten-
nessee Code Annotated § 50-7-709, and arguing 
that the statute does not provide that the employer 
must reimburse the State for unemployment bene-
fits fraudulently received by the employee. The trial 
court denied Thompson's motion to alter or amend, 
but granted the motion for an extension. 
In January, 1997, the trial court entered another 
order, noting that the Department of Employment 
Security would not accept the funds and allowing 
Thompson to pay the funds to the clerk and master 
of the court. After the funds were paid, trial was re-
set for November, 1997. 
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At trial, the parties disputed the effect of the 
April 10, 1992 letter. Telco argued that the letter 
created only an expectation of compensation, not 
guaranteed employment for a definite term. 
Thompson argued that the letter created an employ-
ment contract with a definite five-year term. In ad-
dition, the parties disputed whether Thompson re-
quested Telco to state "lack of work" as the reason 
for his termination. 
Thompson testified that he signed the April 10, 
1992 agreement approximately one week after he 
accepted employment with Telco. He said that he 
wanted an employment agreement because he had 
been advised by someone who had previously 
worked for Telco that "they didn't stand behind 
what they said they was going to do.'Thompson de-
scribed his reasons for entering into the agreement: 
*3 The main thing I wanted as far as the 40 
hours, I wanted to be sure that I had time available. 
If I left my other job to come work for them, I 
didn't want them to all of a sudden say, well, we 
can only have you here for 20 hours a week. I 
wanted to be guaranteed that that 40 would be there 
available for me, and some overtime. 
Under the terms of the agreement, he received 
$1.00 per hour yearly pay raises. 
Wass testified that he did not intend for the let-
ter agreement he and Thompson signed to be a five-
year contract: 
Well, what we were trying to do at the time 
was establish some type of pay scale for him so 
when he came aboard we could try to establish 
what his pay rate was going to be and set up some 
bonuses and just try to determine where he could be 
within any time period, per year, one year up to five 
years. 
All we were trying to do is set down some 
parameters for him to realize his potential and say, 
okay, with this company if you are here up to five 
years, you could be making "X" amount of dollars 
per hour and you could achieve this and beyond this 
period, you could go further than that. We just kind 
of left the constraint here to kind of give him some 
© 2008 Thomson/West. No 
parameters to adjust for his cost of living, over 
time, perhaps, and for him to get an ideal [sic] were 
[were] he could be provided everything worked out. 
But in no way, shape or form, as the good Lord 
as my witness, was there ever any intent here for 
this to be guaranteed employment for five years. It 
was just a pay scale type thing and that is all it was. 
David Burt, Telco's Chief Financial Officer, 
testified that none of the other approximately two 
hundred seventy Telco employees have any type of 
employment contract. 
The parties also testified about the application 
and enforcement of the employee guidelines. The 
Telco Employee Guidelines, signed by Thompson 
in January, 1993, provide: "If you clock-in after 
8:00 a.m., you do not get a morning break. There 
are no exceptions! Anyone not adhering to this 
policy will be docked 15 minutes.'Thompson had 
several disciplinary action reports indicating that he 
arrived late for work, but took a morning break in 
violation of the employee guidelines. Thompson 
was written up on October 24, 1994, January 31, 
1995, August 1, 1995, August 3, 1995, and August 
7, 1995. Thompson did not dispute that the reports 
were filled out on him, but testified that he had not 
seen one of them. 
Thompson testified that he routinely arrived 
after 8:00 a.m. for work and that, prior to the fall of 
1994, Telco management never told him it was ne-
cessary to arrive exactly at 8:00. He never received 
any admonitions concerning his failure to work 
forty hours per week. Thompson testified that he 
never refused work; he simply did whatever Wass 
brought him to do. He also denied being insubor-
dinate to any manager at Telco. 
Thompson testified that he did not believe that 
all of the employee guidelines applied to him based 
on statements allegedly made by Wass that he 
should not worry about certain rules such as break 
times or arrival by 8:00 a.m. He admitted that the 
parties' letter agreement did not say that the em-
ployee guidelines did not apply to him. 
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*4 Telco introduced Thompson's personnel file 
showing that Thompson consistently worked less 
than forty hours per week. Telco also introduced in-
to evidence the employee personnel files for several 
other telephone repair technicians showing they 
worked considerably more hours than Thompson. 
Samuel Price Johnson, the Technician Super-
visor at Telco, testified about the change in Telco's 
product mix. He also testified that other telephone 
repair technicians worked overtime while 
Thompson did not, which created morale problems 
with the other workers. Chris Kivalon, the Produc-
tion Control Manager at Telco, testified that 
Thompson's habit of coming in late for work and 
nevertheless taking a morning break created morale 
problems in his department because he strictly en-
forced the employee guidelines against the employ-
ees in his department. 
Wass, Thompson's immediate supervisor, also 
testified that the product mix of the company 
changed over the years Thompson was employed. 
He testified that, although Thompson never refused 
work, Thompson indicated that he preferred not to 
work on certain products. He denied telling 
Thompson that some of the employee guidelines 
did not apply to him, but admitted that he did not 
write Thompson up for violations of the guidelines 
until October, 1994. 
Timothy James Burgin, Telco's General Man-
ager, testified that he wrote Thompson up several 
times for violations of the employee guidelines. 
Burgin testified that, at a meeting about one of the 
discipline reports, Thompson told him that, if Telco 
was not satisfied with his performance and wanted 
to terminate him, the company would have to buy 
out the remainder of his contract. 
David Burt, Telco's Chief Financial Officer, 
testified that, on the day Thompson was fired, 
Thompson requested that Telco find a way to get 
him unemployment benefits. Burt explained why he 
wrote the letter listing "lack of work" as the reason 
for Thompson's termination: 
© 2008 Thomson/West. No 
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[D]uring the day that Kerry was terminated, he 
was requesting that we work out a way so that he 
would receive unemployment benefits. We thought 
about it and I talked it over with the other members 
of management over the next couple of days before 
he called us back and, you know, we reviewed the 
reasons for why he was terminated and we just kind 
of rationalized that there really was a lack of work 
and he wasn't giving us a good 40 hours a week and 
so forth. And, you know, although I realize now 
that wasn't the best decision I have ever made, that 
was the decision that we did make and we worded it 
that he had been laid off due to lack of work for 
that reason. 
Wass stated that he was not involved in the de-
cision to state that Thompson was terminated for 
"lack of work." He testified that Thompson was ter-
minated for breaking the rules and not being able to 
adapt to the changes occurring in the company. 
Tim Burgin testified, that at the August 8th ter-
mination meeting, Thompson became upset about 
the prospect of not having any income. At first, ac-
cording to Burgin, Thompson demanded his annuity 
check and then asked if there was a way to word the 
termination letter so that he could receive unem-
ployment compensation benefits. Burgin admitted 
that the real reason for Thompson's termination was 
insubordination and failure to follow the employee 
guidelines. The termination report in Thompson's 
personnel file stated that Thompson was terminated 
for "Repeated violations of Rules, Disregard for au-
thority, Unsatisfactory performance (amount of out 
put for time spent)" and for "violation of contract-
not working 40+ hours." 
*5 In an a memorandum opinion, the trial court 
concluded that the April 10, 1992 letter agreement 
was a contract for a five-year term. It found that 
"[t]o the extent that there are conflicts between the 
testimony of plaintiff and the testimony of Greg 
Wass and Tim Burgin, the court credits the testi-
mony of plaintiff.'Tn addition, the trial court found 
that Telco had waived its right to rely upon the em-
ployee guidelines as a reason for termination, be-
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cause of its habitual failure to enforce them. The 
trial court awarded Thompson $62,235 plus in- terest. 
Regarding the unemployment compensation 
benefit funds, the trial court ordered: 
IT IS FURTHER DECLARED AND DE-
CREED that the fund in the amount of Five Thou-
sand Six Hundred Eighty Four Dollars and 38/100 
now held by the Clerk and Master pursuant to prior 
orders is hereby escheated to the State of Tennessee 
and the clerk is directed to furnish appropriate no-
tice to the State Treasurer in accordance with 
T.C.A. §31-6-114. 
On appeal, Telco argues that the April 10, 1992 
letter agreement was not a contract for a five-year 
term of employment, and that it had good cause to 
terminate Thompson. Telco argues that the trial 
court erred in not dismissing the lawsuit after find-
ing that Thompson had unclean hands. Telco con-
tends it was error for the trial court to sua sponte 
strike its defense of accord and satisfaction before 
Telco introduced evidence on the defense. Telco as-
serts that the trial court erred in finding that Telco 
waived its right to enforce the employee guidelines. 
Telco also argues that the amount of the judgment 
was erroneous because it was not supported by the 
evidence and because the trial court did not con-
sider Thompson's duty to mitigate damages. 
Thompson maintains that the award of damages 
should be affirmed, but argues that the trial court 
erred in requiring him to reimburse the unemploy-
ment compensation benefits he received. 
Our review of this case is governed by Rule 
13(d) of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Proced-
ure, which provides that review of findings of fact 
by the trial court shall be de novo upon the record 
of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of 
correctness, unless the evidence preponderates oth-
erwise. See Tenn. R.App. P. 13(d); Union Carbide 
Corp. v. Huddleston, 854 S.W.2d 87, 91 
(Tenn. 1993). Findings of law are not entitled to a 
presumption of correctness and our review is de 
novo. See Rainey v. Stansell, 836 S.W.2d 117, 118 
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Telco argues first that the April 10, 1992 letter 
agreement was not a contract for a definite term of 
employment. Telco does not dispute that the letter 
agreement was a valid contract regarding 
Thompson's compensation and other benefits if he 
remained employed. Thus, Telco argues that the let-
ter created a guaranteed compensation level if 
Thompson remained employed, but not a guarantee 
of employment for a specific term. 
*6 Thompson argues that the circumstances 
show that the parties meant the letter agreement to 
be a five-year employment contract, such as 
Thompson's testimony that he would not have left 
his prior job without a contract. Thompson also 
points to statements by Telco employees that 
Thompson had a contract, such as Burgin's state-
ment in Thompson's termination meeting that work-
ing less than forty hours a week was a breach of his 
employment contract, as well as the termination re-
port stating that Thompson violated the contract by 
not working forty hours a week. 
Tennessee has long adhered to the doctrine of 
employment at will. See Bennett v. Sterner-Liff Iron 
& Metal Co., 826 S.W.2d 119, 121 (Tenn.1992). 
Under the employment at will doctrine, in the ab-
sence of a clear contractual agreement, either party 
in the employment relationship may terminate the 
relationship at any time, with or without cause. See 
/"df."[T]here is a presumption that an employee is an 
employee at will. This presumption must be over-
come by specific language guaranteeing a definite 
term of employment."Davis v Connecticut Gen 
Life Ins. Co., 743 F.Supp. 1273, 1280 
(M.D.Tenn.1990). Employment for an indefinite 
term is employment at will.Nelson Trabue, Inc. v. 
Professional Management-Automotive, Inc., 589 
S.W.2d 661, 663 (Tenn. 1979); Hooks v. Gibson, 
842 S.W.2d 625, 628 (Tenn.App.1992). 
Telco cites Loeffler v. Kjellgren, 884 S.W.2d 
463 (Tenn.App.1994), in support of its argument 
that the letter agreement was not a five-year con-
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tract. In Loeffler, an employee sued his former em-
ployer for breach of contract, based on a letter that 
the employee asserted was a contract. During the 
employment negotiations, the employer sent the 
employee the following letter: 
This letter will confirm my interest in employ-
ing your services to establish and run a plastic com-
pany (splash guards). 
As you requested, I have outlined your expect-
ations for compensation: 
1) First year salary $45,000.00 
2) Second year salary $50,000.00 
3) Participation in group insurance plan 
provided by Fleetline. 
4) Reimbursement for relocation to Tennessee 
5) After working for four (4) years, you will be 
provided a $25,000.00 per year for four (4) years 
for consulting fees. 
Thanking you, in advance, and hoping to hear 
from you in the very near future, I remain, 
Yours very truly, 
Fred M. Kjellgren 
President 
Id. at 466.The trial court directed a verdict on 
the breach of contract claim, finding that the letter 
did not constitute an offer. See id. at 467.The appel-
late court found no material evidence to support the 
employee's claim that the letter was a contract. See 
id. at 468.The appellate court stated that "[t]he let-
ter merely confirms defendants' 'interest' in em-
ploying plaintiffs services and outlines, per 
plaintiffs request, plaintiffs 'expectations for com-
pensation.' The letter does not offer the plaintiff a 
contract of employment for an eight year term."/<i. 
The court noted that, in order to overcome the pre-
sumption in Tennessee that employment is termin-
able at will, "the employer must use specific lan-
guage which guarantees employment for a definite 
term."A/. The Loeffler court concluded that the 
letter "simply set forth what plaintiff c ould e x-
pect to earn by way of compensation if he con-
tinued to work for Fleetline; there is no guaran-
tee of employment for a definite term."M 
© 2008 Thomson/West. No 
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*7 Telco also cites Brock v Provident Life and 
Accident Insurance Co., No. 
03A01-9509-CV-00297, 1996 WL 134943 
(Tenn.App. Mar.27, 1996). In Brock, when all of 
the plaintiff employees were originally hired, they 
signed documents explaining that their employment 
was at-will. See id. at — l . T h e employees argued, 
however, that a subsequent letter accepting them in-
to a special project unit within the company created 
an employment contract for a specific term. See id. 
at -—2.The subsequent letter read, "This project as-
signment period is between 2 1/2 to 3 years."Id. 
The trial court concluded that the letter did not 
change the employees' status from at-will employ-
ment, and this was affirmed on appeal. See id at -
—4-5.Relying on Loeffler, this Court found no lan-
guage guaranteeing employment or stating a specif-
ic term for employment. See id. at —4.The Court 
also noted that other language in the second letter 
stated that it was not a contractual agreement. See id. 
Thompson distinguishes Loeffler by noting that 
the letter in Loeffler merely indicated an interest in 
hiring the employee, while the letter in this case 
was an agreement reflecting the intent of the 
parties. In this case, it is undisputed that the letter 
agreement was an employment contract; the dispute 
is whether the parties intended the terms of the con-
tract to include employment for a definite term of 
five years. The only language in the letter that is ar-
guable is the provision that Thompson "will be 
guaranteed a minimum $1.00 per hour raise per 
year over the next five (5) years."Clearly the import 
of this statement is to convey the level at which 
Thompson would be compensated, not the length of 
time he would be employed. Under Tennessee case-
law, the reference to five years is not sufficiently 
specific to create a contract for a definite term of 
employment. See Davis v. Connecticut Gen Life 
Ins. Co., 743 F. Spp.. 1273, 1280 (M.D.Tenn.1990); 
Brock v Provident Life and Accident Ins Co, No 
03A01-9509-CV-00297, 1996 WL 134943, at -—4 
(Tenn.App. Mar.27, 1996); Loeffler v. Kjellgren, 
884 S.W.2d 463, 468 (Tenn.App. 1994). Moreover, 
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the testimony of the parties does not indicate that 
the parties intended to create an agreement for em-
ployment for a definite term Wass, the person who 
signed the letter agreement on behalf of Telco, test-
ified that he had no intent to create a contract for 
employment for a five-year term Thompson testi-
fied that, at the time he signed the letter agreement, 
his concern was that he would be guaranteed forty 
hours per week, so that his hours could not be re-
duced to part-time Even Thompson did not testify 
that he intended to create a contract of employment 
for a definite five-year term Under all of these cir-
cumstances, we must conclude that the evidence 
preponderates against the trial court's finding that 
the letter agreement constituted an agreement of 
employment for a definite five-year term 
Thompson was an employee at will, and his termin-
ation did not breach the agreement between the 
parties Therefore, the trial court's award of dam-
ages to Thompson in the amount of $62,235 must 
be reversed 
*8 This holding pretermits the other issues 
raised by Telco on appeal 
Thompson argues on appeal that the trial court 
erred in ordering him to pay into court the monies 
he received as unemployment compensation bene-
fits and then decreeing that the monies escheated to 
the State The trial court's order instructing 
Thompson to refund the monies did not find that 
the parties fraudulently entered into the termination 
letter in an effort to defraud the State, but stated 
that "a violation of T C A § 50-7-709 may have oc-
curred "After the Tennessee Department of Em-
ployment Security refused to accept the funds from 
Thompson, the trial court granted Thompson pei-
mission to pay the funds to the clerk of the court 
When the trial court decreed that the funds es-
cheated to the State, it ordered the clerk to furnish 
appropriate notice to the State Treasurer in accord-
ance with Tennessee Code Annotated § 
31-6-114 FN2 
FN2 This section, involving the joinder of 
the treasurer, reads 
© 2008 Thomson/West No 
(a) In any case in any court of this state in-
volving the title to any property, including but not 
limited to proceedings involving the validity or 
construction of wills, where it shall appear that 
such property may be subject to escheat under this 
chapter, the state treasurer shall be made a party de-
fendant therein, either in the original pleadings, on 
motion of any party, on petition of the treasurer, or 
by the court on its own motion Process shall be 
served on the treasurer as otherwise provided by 
law, and after making such investigation as he 
deems appropriate, he shall, through the attorney 
general, file such pleadings and take such position 
as may be determined to best protect the interest of 
the state 
(b) In any such case, if the court decrees that 
the property has escheated to this state under this 
chapter, then no further proceeding shall be neces-
sary to establish the state's right thereto and such 
property shall be disposed of by the tieasurer as 
herein provided for other property escheating to the 
state 
Tenn Code Ann §31-6-114(1984) 
We must conclude that the trial court implicitly 
found that the parties had entered into an agreement 
to defraud the State, based on the parties' testimony 
that Thompson was not terminated for 'lack of 
work " However, even if "lack of work" was not 
the true reason for Thompson's termination, there 
was no finding by the trial court that Thompson 
was terminated for a reason that would disqualify 
him from receiving unemployment benefits Unless 
Thompson would not have received unemployment 
compensation benefits but for the statement that he 
was terminated for "lack of work," there can be no 
finding that he fraudulently received the benefits 
From the record, it appears that the reasons for 
Thompson's discharge were excessive tardiness re 
peated violation of the company rule against taking 
a break when an employee is tardy, and unsatisfact-
ory job performance by failing to adapt to changes 
in the company and failure to work sufficient hours 
The disqualifications for receiving unemploy-
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ment compensation benefits include among other 
reasons, "misconduct connected with [the] 
claimant's work "Tenn Code Ann § 50-7-303 
(Supp 1998) The burden of proving disqualifica-
tion for benefits is on the employer Simmons v 
Culpepper, 937 S W2d 938, 945 (Tenn App 1996) 
Under some circumstances, actions such as excess-
ive tardmess, repeated violations of company rules 
and failure to work sufficient hours may amount to 
"misconduct" under the statute if "the whole of the 
facts reveal that [the] actions exhibit a wanton, 
careless, and negligent disregard for the interest o f 
the employer Id 
unemployment compensation benefits be escheated 
to the State 
The decision of the trial court is reversed and 
the cause is remanded for further proceedings con 
sistent with this Opinion Costs are taxed to Ap 
pellee, for which execution may issue if necessary 
CANTRELL and KOCH, JR , JJ , concur 
Tenn App, 1999 
Thompson v Telco, Inc 
Not Reported in S W 2 d , 1999 WL 548610 
(Tenn Ct App) 
In this case, however, Thompson's actions, 
while warranting discharge, do not amount to the 
type of misconduct that would disqualify him from 
receiving unemployment compensation benefits 
Consequently, since Thompson would not have 
been disqualified from receiving unemployment 
compensation benefits even if he had not been giv-
en the letter stating that he was terminated for "lack 
of work," there can be no finding that he fraudu-
lently received the benefits On this basis, we con-
clude that the trial court erred in requiring 
Thompson to pay the monies into court and then or-
dering the funds escheated to the State We do not 
reach the issue of whether the trial court had au-
thority sua sponte to take these actions regarding 
the unemployment compensation benefits Since the 
State is not a party to this appeal we do not order 
the State to repay the funds to Thompson, however, 
nothing in this Opinion precludes Thompson from 
filing an action against the State to recover the 
monies All other issues raised on appeal are preter-
mitted 
END OF DOCUMENT 
*9 In sum, we find that the letter agreement 
lacks language expressly guaranteeing a definite 
term of employment, and that consequently 
Thompson was an employee at will Therefore, the 
trial court's award of damages for breach of con-
tract is reversed In addition, the trial court erred in 
ordering Thompson to pay into court the unemploy-
ment compensation benefits and in ordering that the 
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MEMORANDUM DECISION 
MAETANI, J. 
*1 This matter came before the Honorable 
Howard H. Maetani, Fourth District Court Judge, 
on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, 
filed on December 8, 1997, and Plaintiffs Opposi-
tion and Cross Motion for Summary Judgment, 
filed April 8, 1998. Defendant filed a Reply on 
April 17, 1998, and oral arguments were heard on 
April 21, 1998. The Court took the matter under ad-
visement. 
Having reviewed the file, considered the 
memoranda of counsel, heard oral arguments, and 
being fully advised in the premises, the Court is-
sues the following: 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
I 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Micron manufactures dynamic random-ac-
cess-memory microchips at its manufacturing plant 
in Boise, Idaho. This is Micron's only operating 
© 2008 Thomson/West. No 
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production plant. 
2. Based on market conditions in late 1994 and 
early 1995, Micron developed plans to increase its 
production capacity. In July 1995, Micron began 
construction of a new plant in Lehi, Utah, anticipat-
ing that it would begin production in July 1996. 
3. Around the time construction began on the 
Lehi plant, Micron asked David Cheffings, Pat 
Otte, Dennis Varie and Brad Mabe to move to Utah 
and become the Fabrication Manager, Production 
Manager, Shift Manager and Personnel Manager, 
respectively, at the new facility. 
4. In October and November 1995, Messrs. 
Cheggings, Otte, Blackburn, Mabe and other Mi-
cron managers began interviewing candidates-in-
cluding plaintiffs-for positions as "operators'1 
(individuals who perform production labor) in the 
production area known as the "Fab area." Micro n 
wanted to hire 25 operators in its first round of in-
terviews. Micron anticipated that it would eventu-
ally employ 1,500 operators at the Lehi plant within 
five years after the July 1996 start-up. 
5. Micron conducted interviews with operator 
candidates at the Provo office of Utah Job Service. 
Micron began each round of interviews with gener-
al orientation sessions with approximately 10-20 
candidates per session. After a general orientation, 
each candidate, including each of the plaintiffs, 
completed an employment application which stated: 
I understand and agree that, if hired, my em-
ployment will be for no definite period, and it can 
be terminated with or without cause, and with or 
without notice, at any time at the option of either 
[Micron] or myself. I understand further that the 
terms of my employment may be changed at any 
time at the discretion of company management. 
Each of the plaintiffs, with the exception of 
Ms. Walsh, signed on the line below this paragraph. 
6. After completing the employment applica-
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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tion, each of the plaintiffs and the other job candid-
ates participated in a series of individual interviews 
with different Micron managers including Messrs. 
Cheffings, Otte, Blackburn, Mabe and others. Dur-
ing these interviews, the Micron managers told 
each of the plaintiffs that Micron was hiring "key 
people" to take to Boise to "train as supervisors" or, 
"train to advance to positions as supervisors" for 
the Lehi plant. When asked, they informed the 
plaintiffs that an operator is paid $6.75 per hour, a 
trainer is paid $7.75 per hour and a supervisor re-
ceives a salary of $31,000 per year. 
*2 7. Micron also told plaintiffs and other oper-
ator candidates that Micron would require them to 
participate in an expedited training program at its 
Boise, Idaho manufacturing plant (the "Boise 
Plant") for six to nine months. Operators trained at 
the Boise Plant would receive temporary relocation 
benefits. 
8. In late November and early December 1995, 
Micron offered each of the plaintiffs (and 21 oth-
ers) a position as an operator at the Lehi Plant and 
Micron asked each of the plaintiffs to begin training 
at Micron's Boise Plant in January 1996. The 
plaintiffs accepted. Micron provided each plaintiff 
with relocation benefits which included temporary 
housing (an apartment or stipend equivalent), travel 
expenses to and from Boise, and a monthly stipend 
for incidental expenses. Micron informed each 
plaintiff that she would be required to repay these 
temporary relocation expenses if he or she quit 
within the first 12 months of her employment. 
9. During the Summer and Fall of 1995, while 
construction of the Lehi Plant was in its early 
phases, market conditions remained relatively 
strong. However, in November and December of 
1995, market conditions, including specifically the 
average selling prices for microchips, began to de-
teriorate. 
10. Micron decided during the last week of 
December of 1995 to change the construction site 
for the Lehi Plant to a more "normalized" construc-
© 2008 Thomson/West. No 
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tion schedule. At that time, Micron anticipated that 
the change in schedule would move completion of 
the Lehi Plant back so that operation would begin 
in approximately December 1996, as opposed to Ju-
ly 1996, as originally planned. 
11. Shortly before or after the plaintiffs arrived 
in Boise for training, Micron informed each of them 
that delay in completion of the Lehi Plant would 
extend their training to twelve months. 
12. During orientation, each of the plaintiffs re-
ceived certain materials and was asked to complete 
certain forms. Among the materials distributed, 
each plaintiff received a Micron employee hand-
book entitled "Team Member Handbook." Each 
plaintiff acknowledged receipt of the handbook and 
agreed to read it. The first page of the handbook 
contains the following statement: 
[Micron] has prepared this handbook to 
provide team members (Employees) with an over-
view of [Micron's] policies, benefits, And rules. 
This handbook is not a contract, and is not to be 
construed as being one. Compliance with the hand-
book's terms is not a guarantee of continued em-
ployment with Micron. All team members are em-
ployees at will, which means that their employment 
with Micron may be terminated by either the em-
ployee or [Micron], at any time, with or without 
cause or advance notice.... 
General Standards of Conduct 
Team members should understand that their 
employment is "at will," which means that their 
employment can be terminated at any time by either 
the team member or [Micron] and with or without 
cause, notice or eligibility for rehire. Micron team 
members are not subject to any probationary period 
nor are they entitled to an expectation of continued 
employment. Therefore, team members should re-
cognize that conduct in addition to that listed be-
low, may also result in disciplinary action or ter-
mination. 
*3 The Team Member Handbook subsequently 
lists and describes examples of activities and ac-
tions for which an employee may be terminated, in-
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eluding inadequate job performance, tardiness and 
absenteeism, insubordination and disruptive con-
duct, harassment, health and safety violations, and 
unethical behavior The Team member Handbook 
further states that it is not possible to anticipate all 
of the possible reasons for termination and reserves 
the right to terminate employees for any other reas-
on 
13 The plaintiffs were traming at Micron's 
Boise Plant during February 1996 At that time, the 
average selling price of microchips continued to de-
cline Because the decline continued for a signific-
ant period, Micron's management became increas-
ingly convinced that the decline represented a long-
term market trend and that there was no longer de-
mand sufficient to justify expansion of the Boise 
Plant or completion of the Lehi Plant As a result, 
on February 26, 1997, Micron delayed completion 
of the planned expansion of the Boise Plant and 
construction of the Lehi Plant 
14 After Micron announced that it would in-
definitely delay completion of the Lehi Plant, Mi-
cron offered each of the plaintiffs and the other op-
erators training in Boise (a) a position as an operat-
or at the Boise Plant at the same wage rate, with 
significant relocation benefits, or (b) two months' 
severance pay Micron also informed each of the 
plaintiffs that it would not request that she repay re-
location expenses Micron previously paid if she de-
cided to not accept employment with Micron in 
Boise 
15 Each of the Plaintiffs declined Micron's of-
fer of continued employment in Boise Each of the 
plaintiffs, except Ms Walker (a) filled out and 
signed a Resignation/Discharge Request form stat-
ing that she resigned because of the Lehi slow-
down, and (b) accepted severance equal to two 
months' pay 
16 May 17, 1996, Plaintiffs filed a Complaint 
alleging Breach of Contract, Promissory Estoppel, 
Negligent Misrepresentation, Fraudulent Misrepres-
entation, Breach of Implied Covenant of Good 
© 2008 Thomson/West No 
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Faith and Fair Dealing, and Negligent Infliction of 
Emotional Distress 
17 July 14, 1996, Defendant filed an Answer 
denying Plaintiffs' allegations 
18 December 8, 1997, Defendant filed a Mo-
tion for Summary Judgment 
19 April 8, 1998, Plaintiff filed an Opposition 
and Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment 
20 April 17, 1998, Defendant filed a Reply 
21 April 21, 1998, the Court heard oral argu 
ments and took the matter under advisement 
II 
STANDARD FOR MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 
56(a) and (b), a party against whom a claim has 
been made, may at any time move for a summary 
judgment in his favor The motion should be gran-
ted if " the pleadings, depositions, answers to in 
terrogatones, and admissions on file, together with 
the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact and that the moving 
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 
law "URCP Rule 56C 
III 
ISSUES 
*4 Plaintiffs argue that they entered into a 
three-year employment contract with Micron and 
that it breached the contract by failing to employ 
the plaintiffs at the Lehi, Utah Plant Defendant ar-
gues that Plaintiffs were at will employees and that 
they were offered employment at the Boise Plant 
to Ong U S Govt Works 
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when the Lehi Plant construction ceased due to an 
economic downturn in the price of microchips. 
IV 
ANALYSIS 
A. The plaintiffs were "at will" employees of Mi-
cron 
There is a presumption that an employment re-
lationship which does not have a specified duration 
is "at will" and may be terminated at any time by 
either employee or employer. In order to rebut this 
presumption the burden falls on the party claiming 
that there was an express or implied contract to ter-
minate only for cause. 
In Evans v. GTE Health Systems, Inc., the Utah 
Court of Appeals held that "general expressions of 
long-term employment or job advancement do not 
convert an at-will employment contract to a termin-
ation only for cause contract."857 P.2d 974 
(Ct.App.1993), quoting Vancheri v. GNLV Corp., 
Ill P.2d 366 (Nev.1989). In that case, the plaintiff 
resigned from previous employment to relocate to 
Florida. The Defendant agreed that it would not ter-
minate the plaintiff during the first twelve to eight-
een months of employment for failure to sell 
enough systems. The company made no promise 
not to terminate based on any other reason. It only 
made a general expression of long-term employ-
ment and agreed not to fire the plaintiff based 
solely on his sales record. In addition, the Court 
made this decision knowing that the plaintiff had 
sold his home, relocated to Florida to begin training 
and declined another job offer, the plaintiffs wife 
closed her preschool and referred students to other 
schools. The Court knew that the plaintiff had made 
significant relocation decisions and still ruled that 
the plaintiff was an "at will" employee. 
In the present case, the plaintiffs allege and 
© 2008 Thomson/West. No 
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may have in fact made significant arrangements to 
relocate to Boise for one year. In light of the 
Court's decision in Evans it is immaterial in the de-
termination of the plaintiffs' status as employees. 
The agreement between the plaintiffs and Micron 
did not contain a specific duration of employment. 
It was a general expression of long-term employ-
ment, which according to the Court in Evans does 
not convert an "at-will" status into an employment 
contract for cause. The plaintiffs were to train for 
one year in Boise and then return as supervisors for 
an undetermined length of time at the Lehi Plant. 
Plaintiffs' counsel claims that the plaintiff in Evans 
was not "facing the extensive, pressure filled back-
ground circumstances of the instant case."See 
Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Defend-
ant's Motion for Summary Judgment and in Support 
of Their Cross Motion for Summary Judgment, p 6 
Plaintiffs counsel fails to recognize, or chooses to 
ignore, that the plaintiff in Evans didn't plan to 
move to Florida for one year, but permanently. He 
sold his home, his wife closed her business and 
when the plaintiff was fired due to economic down-
turn, he was not offered comparable employment at 
another location. In the present case, the plaintiffs 
were asked to relocate for one year and when the 
Lehi Plant was delayed due to economic downturn 
they were not tired. Rather, the plaintiffs were 
offered comparable employment at the Boise Plant, 
the only Micron Plant in operation. The plaintiff in 
Evans was in a worse position than the plaintiffs in 
the present case. Even if the plaintiffs had been in a 
worse position it still wouldn't matter. The Court in 
Evans did not consider the hardship placed on the 
plaintiff in determining his status as an "at-will" 
employee. 
*5 Plaintiffs have the burden of rebutting the 
presumption of "at-will" employment. They must 
prove that there was an intent on the Defendant's 
part to create an implied contract. Intent can be 
demonstrated in employment manuals, oral agree-
ments and circumstances demonstrating an intent 
only to terminate for cause. However, the Utah 
Court of Appeals held in Trembly v Mrs Fields 
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Cookies, that where an employee handbook ex-
pressly changes the condition of an employee's em-
ployment, the modified conditions become part of 
the employment contract if the employee knew that 
a handbook was distributed. 884 P.2d 1306, 1312 
(1994). In the present case, Micron expressly stated 
in several locations that the positions would be 
"at-will" employment. The plaintiffs filled out Mi-
cron's employment application and received a Mi-
cron Team Member Handbook, both of which 
placed language prominently on the first page in-
dicating that the employment would be "at-will." 
The application stated, "I understand and agree 
that, if hired, my employment will be for no defin-
ite period, and it can be terminated with or without 
cause, and with or without notice, at any time at the 
option of either [Micron] or myself'The Micron 
Team Member Handbook stated: 
This handbook is not a contract, and is not to 
be construed as being one. Compliance with the 
handbook's terms is not a guarantee of continued 
employment with Micron. All team members are 
employees at will, which means that their employ-
ment with [Micron] may be terminated by either the 
employee or [Micron], at any time, with or without 
cause or advance notice. 
In addition to these prominently placed dis-
claimers, the Handbook reiterates that the employ-
ment is "at-will" under the heading, "General 
Standards of Conduct." In Kir berg v. West One 
Bank, the Utah Court of Appeals held that where an 
employee signed an employment application and 
had access to an employee handbook, both of which 
contained express disclaimers, the employment re-
lationship was determined to be "at-will." 872 P.2d 
39 (Utah Ct.App.1994). In order to rebut the 
"at-will" presumption and statements contained in 
these documents, the plaintiffs must offer evidence 
that Micron intended to change the "at-will" em-
ployment. In Johnson v. Morton Thiokol, the Utah 
Supreme Court held that an implied-in-fact contract 
term may be found only where the employer's al-
leged promise meets the requirements of an offer of 
a unilateral contract. 818 P.2d 997 (1991). The Su-
© 2008 Thomson/West. No 
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preme Court also explains its decision in Berube v. 
Fashion Centre, Ltd., which the plaintiff cites to 
support the argument that plaintiffs status was 
altered from "at-will" employment. 771 P.2d 1033 
(Utah 1989). However, the plaintiffs failed to ad-
dress that the Supreme Court explained its decision 
in Berube in Johnson v. Morton Thiokol, Inc., 818 
P.2d 997 (Utah 1991). The Court said in footnote 9 
of Johnson, that an "employee manual can rebut the 
presumption of at-will employment by showing the 
existence of an implied-in-fact contract term 
providing that the employment is not at will."The 
Court went on to say that at-will employment may 
be rebutted by an implied contract term. However, 
in the present case, the handbook clearly states in 
more than one place, that the plaintiffs employment 
was at-will; nor does the handbook contain any 
terms that can be offered to even suggest an implied 
contract term. Therefore, an implied contract was 
not created through statements in the handbook. 
*6 Alternatively, Plaintiffs allege that Micron 
made a promise creating an implied contract 
through its agents during the initial interviewing 
process. Plaintiffs claim that job service interview-
ers indicated that Micron was hiring for 
"long-term" employment and was looking for the 
"cream of the crop" to work as trainers and super-
visors in the Lehi Plant. Plaintiffs also argue that 
because they were required to relocate for one year 
to train in Boise and would be liable for relocation 
costs if they quit during the training, that this con-
dition created an implied contract. However, the 
Court held in Evans, as previously discussed, that a 
general expression of long-term employment is not 
sufficient to create an employment contract. The 
fact that plaintiffs would have to pay back the relo-
cation money paid to them if they quit early does 
not indicate an intent or promise on Micron's part. 
It simply is a matter of reimbursement of funds. 
Even if an implied agreement had been created by 
these interviewers, the express "at-will" disclaimers 
distributed in the application and employee hand-
book would supersede and modify any agreements, 
thus rendering the employment "at-will." Trembly 
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v. Mrs. Fields Cookies, 884 P.2d 1306 (Utah 
Ct.App.1994). Micron did not create an implied 
contract nor did it make any promises not to termin-
ate the plaintiffs. 
B. Micron Did Not Breach Any Promise to Plaintiffs 
Micron did not breach any promise to plaintiffs 
nor did it terminate plaintiffs' employment. Micron 
could not offer employment in the Lehi Plant, after 
the year of training in Boise, because the plant's 
construction and use was postponed due to econom-
ic downturn in the price of microchips. Plaintiffs' 
breach of contract and promissory estoppel claims 
rely on the creation of an implied employment con-
tract to terminate only for cause and its subsequent 
breach. For the reasons previously discussed there 
was no employment contract making the employees 
"at-wiir and consequently there could be no breach 
for termination. Either party can terminate an 
"at-will" relationship at any time and for any reas-
on. 
However, not only were the employees 
"at-will", but Micron did not terminate their em-
ployment by offering them work at the Boise Plant. 
The Lehi Plant did not open as scheduled due to the 
declining microchip market. As a result, Micron 
offered the plaintiffs employment in the only oper-
ating Micron Plant in Boise when their training was 
complete. In addition, Micron offered each of the 
plaintiffs a substantial relocation package to move 
to Boise, including moving expenses, two months 
temporary housing and storage, $300 towards round 
trip expenses, 36 hours of time off with pay for re-
location purposes, $1,000 for incidental expenses, 
home sale or lease cancellation assistance (up to 
$18,000 in Realtor fees or $2,500, respectively). 
Each of the plaintiffs, except Ms. Walker, declined 
Micron's offer and signed a Resignation/Discharge 
Request Form stating the "Lehi Slow Down" w as 
the reason for resignation and accepted two months 
severance pay. In Fins tad v. Montana P ower Co., 
the Montana Supreme Court held that an employee 
© 2008 Thomson/West. No 
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was not actually or constructively terminated when 
he refused to relocate to a new office in another city 
where all supervisory staff was being placed. 785 
P.2d 1372 (1990). The plaintiffs chose to resign 
rather than relocate to Boise where the only operat-
ing Micron plant was located. Micron did not ter-
minate the plaintiffs employment, therefore 
plaintiffs' breach of contract and promissory estop-
pel claims fail. 
*7 Even if this Court assumed that an implied 
contract had been created and that Micron termin-
ated the Plaintiffs, their claims would still fail be-
cause delay in completion of the Lehi Plant consti-
tutes good cause for termination. While Utah 
Courts have not issued a case on point, there is a 
Sixth Circuit case that addresses this issue. In 
Boy ton v. TRW, Inc., the court held an employee 
does not have a cause of action for wrongful ter-
mination when the employee was laid off due to ad-
verse economic factors beyond the employer's con-
trol. 858 F.2d 1178 (6th Cir.l986)"To hold other-
wise would impose an unworkable burden on em-
ployers to stay in business to the point of bank-
ruptcy in order to satisfy employment contracts 
....terminable only for good or sufficient cause."Id. 
The Court rejected the employee's claim that a just 
cause employment contract guarantees employment 
regardless of changes in economic conditions. Id. at 
1184. 
In the present case, Micron delayed completion 
of the Lehi Plant due to unanticipated market con-
ditions surrounding the fall of microchip prices. 
Micron's decisions concerning product on have 
been based mainly on market conditions. They in-
clude worldwide market supply and demand for mi-
crochip products, and Micron's operations, cash 
flow, and alternative use of capital. Based on mar-
ket conditions in late 1994 and early 1995, Micron 
developed plans to increase its production capacity. 
Micron expanded its Boise Plant and began acceler-
ated construction of a DRAM microchip manufac-
turing plant in Lehi, Utah. However, in November 
and December of 1995, the selling price of micro-
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chips began to fall. As a result of this decline, Mi-
cron moved the construction schedule for the Lehi 
Plant to a more normalized construction schedule 
during the last week of December 1995. When the 
decline in prices continued, Micron believed that 
the decline represented a long-term market trend 
and that there was no longer demand sufficient to 
justify expansion of the Boise Plant or completion 
of the Lehi Plant. On February 26, 1997, Micron 
delayed completion of the expansion of the Boise 
Plant and construction of the Lehi Plant. These 
events were based on market conditions and consti-
tuted good cause to terminate plaintiffs. Even if Mi-
cron could not terminate plaintiffs except for cause 
and even if Micron had terminated plaintiffs their 
claims would still fail because the sustained decline 
of microchips selling price constitutes good cause 
for termination. Myrold v. NCR Corp., 3 IER Cases 
1009, 1012 (S.D.Cal. 1988). 
C. Plaintiffs' Negligent and Fraudient Misrepres-
entation Claims Fail Because there is No Evidence 
to Support them 
Plaintiffs fraudulent and negligent misrepres-
entation claims are based on the same alleged rep-
resentations made by the job service interviewers 
that plaintiffs argued created an implied employ-
ment contract. The two representations are basically 
that the plaintiffs would be employed in Utah after 
training in Boise for six to nine months, and that 
they would have a chance to receive promotions to 
trainer or supervisor positions at the Lehi Plant. 
Since these alleged representations were not suffi-
cient to rebut the "at-will" presumption, plaintiffs 
are simply trying to take another bite at the apple 
by arguing fraud. When the plaintiffs were hired, 
prior to the economic decline of microchip prices, 
Micron anticipated opening the Lehi Plant and 
staffing it with the plaintiffs and other employees. 
In addition, if the Lehi Plant had been in operation 
when the plaintiffs completed their training they 
would have been eligible to act as trainers or super-
visors to the other employees hired to work in the 
Lehi Plant who weren't required to train in Boise. 
© 2008 Thomson/West. No 
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Plaintiffs are trying to avoid the ramifications of 
being "at-will" employees. 
*8 Defendant argued accurately in its Memor-
andum in Support of Motion for Summary Judge-
ment that a contract claim may not be pled as a 
fraud action in order to circumvent the unavailabil-
ity of a contract remedy for a job termination. 
Locke v. Hamilton Digital Controls, Inc., 8 ICR 
Cases (BNA) 1201 (S.D.Cal. 1993) (fraudulent mis-
representation claims based on assurances of job se-
curity rejected as "creative avenues around the at-
will employment doctrine"); Stephens v. The Clip-
per Inc., 7 ICR Cases (BNA) 727 (N.D.Tex. 1992), 
affd,914 F.2d 1335 (5th Cir.1992) (fraud action 
will not be recognized in addition to contract action 
where the fraud action seeks to enforce contractual 
rights). In addition, the Defendant points out that 
the Utah Supreme Court previously addressed this 
issue in McKinnon v. Corporation of the President 
of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 
529 P.2d 434 (Utah 1974). The Utah Supreme 
Court held that "fraud, generally, cannot be predic-
ated upon the failure to perform a promise or con-
tract which is unenforceable .... for the promisor 
has not, in a legal sense, made a contract; and there-
fore, he has the right, both in law and equity, to re-
fuse to perform."Id. At 436. Micron did not create 
an employment contract with Plaintiffs. They were 
at-will employees and therefore cannot argue fraud-
ulent misrepresentations to create contract implica-
tions when no contract ever existed. Plaintiffs can-
not avoid the at-will status by raising fraudulent 
misrepresentation claims. 
In addition, Plaintiffs' claims of fraudulent mis-
representation fail because they've failed to meet 
the burden of proof. Fraudulent misrepresentation 
requires a showing of an existing material fact, 
made knowingly or recklessly for the purpose of in-
ducing reliance thereon upon which plaintiff relies 
to his detriment. Sugarhouse Finance Co. V. Ander-
son, 610 P.2d 1369, 1373 (Utah 1980); Maack v. 
Resource Design & Const., Inc., 875 P.2d 570, 584 
(Utah Ct.App.1994). Plaintiffs have also failed to 
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prove negligent misrepresentation which requires a 
showing that false representations regarding facts 
were made without using reasonable diligence or 
competence in assessing the truth of the representa-
tions. DeBry v. Valley Mortgage Co., 835 P.2d 
1000, 1008 (Utah Ct.App.1992); Cerritos Trucking 
Co. V. Utah Venture No. 1, 645 P.2d 608, 612 
(Utah 1982). Fraudulent misrepresentation is based 
on presently existing facts, not future promises. Re-
public Group Inc. V. Won-Door Corp., 883 P.2d 
285, 292 (Utah CtApp.1994); Medesco & Faulkner 
v. LNS International, Inc., 762 F.Supp. 920 (1991). 
Plaintiffs argue that the general expressions of 
long-term employment after training in Boise were 
fraudulent misrepresentations. This argument fails 
for two reasons. First, these representations regard 
future events and fraudulent misrepresentations 
must concern presently existing facts. Second, the 
statements made during the interviews with the 
plaintiffs demonstrate that at the time, Micron anti-
cipated the Lehi Plant to open as originally sched-
uled. Micron made general representations of long-
term employment at the Lehi Plant because the eco-
nomic decline in Microchips was not foreseeable at 
that time. Micron interviewers had no idea the Lehi 
Plant would be delayed nor did they have any reas-
on to believe the representations made to plaintiffs 
were false. Plaintiffs were among the first group of 
operators to begin training for the Fab Area in the 
Lehi Plant where Micron planned to eventually em-
ploy approximately 1500 operators. As the first 
group hired, they would be given the opportunity to 
fill the training and supervisory positions if the 
Lehi Plant had opened on schedule, as was anticip-
ated at the time of the interviews. Plaintiffs fail to 
offer any facts indicating that any of the micron 
managers believed these facts to be false or had any 
reason to believe they were untrue at the time they 
were made. Therefore, plaintiffs claims for fraudu-
lent or negligent misrepresentation fail. 
D. Plaintiffs' Claim for Breach of Implied Covenant 
of Good Faith and Fair Dealing 
*9 Plaintiffs base their entire argument on 
© 2008 Thomson/West. No 
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Berube v. Fashion Centre. 771 P.2d 1033, 1046 
(Utah 1989). However, Plaintiffs' fail to address the 
Utah Supreme Court's decision in Sanderson v. 
First Sec. Leasing Co., 844 P.2d 303 (Utah 1992). 
While the Court does note that it is within the fact 
finders responsibility to determine if an implied-
in-fact contract exists, the Court also states that 
"the court retains the power to decide whether as a 
matter of law, a reasonable jury could find that an 
implied contract exists."A/ . At 306, citing Brehany 
v. Nordstrom, Inc., 812 P.2d 49, 56 (Utah 1991); 
Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033, 
1052 (Utah 1989). In addition, the Court goes on to 
address the implied-in-law covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing. Prior to 1992, the Court con-
sidered arguments for implied covenants and ruled 
against them. "Three times in the past three years, 
we have refused to recognize an implied-in-law 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing that creates 
a for-cause standard for dismissal."/^. At 308. The 
Court goes on to explain that while good faith is al-
ways part of a contract, it "cannot be construed 
....to establish new, independent rights or duties not 
agreed upon by the parties.'7c/ At 308, citing 
Brehany at 55. 
The Court again upholds its position in Walker 
v. Union Pacific R. Co., 844 P.2d 335 (Utah 
App.1992). The Court cites its decision in Brehany 
and quotes from its previous decision: 
[I]n the absence of empress terms limiting the 
right of an employer to discharge for any or no 
reason and in the absence of provisions establishing 
procedures by which a discharge should be effectu-
ated it would be inconsistent to hold that an em-
ployer, on the basis of the implied covenant of good 
faith, is bound to a substantive limitation on the 
employer's right to discharge./^, at 55. 
Clearly the Court is maintaining the position 
that an implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing cannot be used to circumvent employee's 
at-will status. Therefore, Plaintiffs' claims for 
breach fails as they were at-will employees, as pre-
viously discussed, and Micron did not terminate 
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them, nor did it act in bad faith by offering compar-
able employment in its only operational plant, in 
Boise 
E Plaintiffs' Negligent Infliction of Emtional Dis-
tress Claims Fail 
The Utah Worker's Compensation Act bars a 
claim against an employer which requires proof of 
mental and/or physical injuries as an indispensable 
part of the claim The Act provides, in relevant part 
The right to recover compensation pursuant to 
this chapter for injuries sustained shall be the ex-
clusive remedy against any employer and the li-
abilities of the employer imposed by this chapter 
shall be in place of any and all other civil liability 
whatsoever, at common law or otherwise, on ac-
count of any accident or injury or death, in any way 
contracted, sustained, aggravated or incurred by 
such employee in the course of or because of or 
arising out of the employee's employment and no 
action at law may be maintained against an employ-
er based upon any accident, injury or death of an 
employee 
*10 Utah Code Ann § 34A-2-105 Under Utah 
law, mental injury is a necessary element of a claim 
for negligent infliction of emotional distress Moun-
teerv Utah Power & Light Co, 823 P 2d 1055, 
1056-59 (Utah 1991), Retherford v A T & T Com-
munications of Mountain States, Inc, 844 P 2d 949, 
964-65 (Utah 1992) As a result, claims for negli-
gent infliction of emotional distress are barred by 
the Act It follows that plaintiffs claims for negli-
gent infliction of emotional distress are barred by 
the Utah Workers' Compensation Act 
Even if The Workers' Compensation Act 
doesn't bar the Plaintiffs' claims, their claims are in-
sufficient to support claims of Emotional Distress 
In Hansen v Mountain Fuel Supply Co, 858 P 2d 
970 (Utah 1993), the Utah Supreme Court ex-
plained the degree of emtional distress necessary to 
sustain a claim for negligent infliction of emotional 
© 2008 Thomson/West No 
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distress The Court stated 
We emphasize that the emotional distress 
suffered must be severe, it must be such that "a 
reasonable (person) normally constituted, would be 
unable to adequately cope with the mental stress 
engendered by the circumstances of the case 
Id quoting Rodriguez v State, 472 P 2d 509, 
520 (1970) The Court in Hansen dismissed the 
plaintiffs' claims because the injuries suffered were 
"transitory anxiety and sleeplessness" and not the 
kind of severe emotion disturbance that would con-
stitute a mental illness The Court indicated that in-
somnia and "anxiety do not amount to the type of 
emtional distress with which a reasonable person, 
normally constituted, would be unable to cope "Id 
In the present case the Plaintiffs' injuries do not 
constitute severe distress that would result in a 
mental illness But even if they did the Plaintiffs' 
claims would still fail because they did not result 
from termination In Hamilton v Parkdale Care 
Center, Inc the Court holds that employees who 
suffer mental injury because of the manner in 
which termination is effected are limited to the 
worker's compensation remedies 904 P 2d 1110 
(Utah App 1995) In this case, as previously dis-
cussed, the Plaintiffs' were not terminated by Mi-
cron They chose to decline positions at the Boise 
Plant and move back to Utah Plaintiffs' cannot 
claim injury due to termination when they were not 
terminated Even if the Plaintiffs' had been termin-
ated their injuries do not meet the level of severe 
emtional distress Plaintiff Walker complains of ul-
cers and depression which can be attributed to her 
broken engagement with her fiance She also admits 
that she suffered from ulcers for a few years prior 
to training at the Boise Plant Plaintiff Smoot 
claims she's experienced hardship and challenges in 
settling down back in Utah after returning from 
Boise She indicates that she's "a little weepy" 
Plaintiff Talbot complains of headaches, insomnia 
and a clenched or popping jaw She admits this is a 
prior condition and that her marriage troubles im-
proved since returning from Boise Plaintiff Walsh 
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complains of stress caused by separation from her 
family while in Boise. 
*11 Plaintiffs' claimed injuries do not rise to 
the level of severe emotional distress constituting a 
mental illness. The "injuries" resulted from normal 
levels of stress experienced in average every day 
life. The Plaintiffs' injuries are insufficient to sus-
tain a cause of action for infliction of emtional dis-
tress. 
V 
I hereby certify that on this 18 day of May, 
1998, I caused to be mailed, via first class mail, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER 
AND JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL WITH PRE-
JUDICE to: 
Gordon Duval 
Duval, Hansen, Witt & Morley 
110 South Main Street 
Pleasant Grove, Utah 84062 
Utah Dist.Ct., 1998. 
Walker v. Micron Technology, Inc. 
Not Reported in P.2d, 1998 WL 1769732 (Utah 
DistCt.), 17 IER Cases 504 
DECISION END OF DOCUMENT 
The Court finds that the plaintiffs were "at 
will" employees of Micron. In addition, Micron did 
not terminate plaintiffs' employment, rather offered 
employment at the only existing plant, in Boise. 
Therefore, the Court GRANTS Defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment. 
The Court DENIES Plaintiffs Cross-Motion 
for Summary Judgment. 
Counsel for Defendant Micron is instructed to 
prepare an Order consistent with this Decision. 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL 
WITH PREJUDICE 
For the reasons set forth in the Court's Memor-
andum Decision filed on May 13, 1998, defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby GRAN-
TED and plaintiffs' Cross-Motion for Summary 
Judgment is DENIED. The plaintiffs' Complaint 
and all the claims for relief asserted therein are dis-
missed with prejudice and on the merits. Defendant 
is hereby awarded its costs and is instructed to pre-
pare a bill of costs in accordance with the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 
CERTIF1CA TE OF SER VICE 
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C 
Yu v. Northwest Pipeline Corp. 
D.Utah, 1991. 
United States District Court, D. Utah, Central Divi-
sion. 
Dorothy D.S. YU, Plaintiff, 
v. 
NORTHWEST PIPELINE CORPORATION, a cor-
poration of the State of Delaware, Juanita Reid, 
Karen McPheeters, Tom O'Keefe and Howard Fin-
ley, Defendants. 
Civ. No. 89-C-834W. 
June 11, 1991. 
Louise T. Knauer, Salt Lake City, Utah, for plaintiff. 
Robert A. Peterson, Teresa Silcox, Paul E. Pratt, 
Northwest Pipeline Corp., Salt Lake City, Utah, for 
defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 
WINDER, District Judge. 
*1 This matter is before the court on cross mo-
tions for summary judgment. A hearing on these 
motions was held March 12, 1991. Plaintiff was 
represented by Louise T. Knauer. Defendants were 
represented by Robert A. Peterson, Teresa Silcox 
and Paul E. Pratt. Before the hearing, the court con-
sidered carefully the memoranda and other materi-
als submitted by the parties. Since taking the matter 
under advisement, the court has further considered 
the law and facts relating to these motions. Now be-
ing fully advised, the court renders the following 
memorandum decision and order. 
BACKGROUND 
Plaintiff is a non-white, Chinese-born woman, 
who was fifty-one years of age when she was ter-
minated by defendant Northwest Pipeline Corpora-
tion ("Northwest") on May 16, 1988. Plaintiff was 
© 2008 Thomson/West. No 
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hired by Northwest in January 1979 and held the 
position of Office Administrator of the Business In-
formation Center at the time of her termination. 
On or about May 6, 1988, defendant Karen 
McPheeters, Northwest's Corporate Librarian, dis-
covered on or in plaintiffs desk a document from 
the Personnel Department listing the degrees, major 
fields of study and universities attended by Northw-
est employees. Plaintiffs duties as Office Adminis-
trator did not involve access to any documents gen-
erated by the personnel department. 
Northwest's Standard Operating Policies and 
Procedures Manual ("SOP Manual"), in effect and 
posted on a bulletin board at the time of plaintiffs 
employment, provided as follows: 
Damaging the integrity of, or compromising 
the confidentiality of corporate information ... may 
be cause for disciplinary action up to an including 
discharge. 
SOP No. 12.3006(3)(m) at 1. The SOP Manual 
further provided thatit should not be inferred from 
this policy than an employee can only be dis-
charged for committing violations on this list 
[including compromising the confidentiality of cor-
porate information], nor should this policy be con-
strued to alter the Company's rights as an employer 
at will. 
Id. 
McPheeters reported to defendant Juanita 
Reed, Manager of Employee Development and 
Communications, that she had discovered the per-
sonnel document in plaintiffs possession. The Per-
sonnel Department then notified defendant Tom 
O'Keefe, Manger of General Services, of the dis-
covery. Defendant Howard Finley, plaintiffs imme-
diate supervisor, was out of town at the time. 
On May 11, 1988, O'Keefe began an investiga-
tion of the matter. During the investigation, 
plaintiff admitted the personnel document was in 
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her possession and that she had obtained the docu-
ment from Trent Enser, an employee in the Records 
Department. Plaintiff said she had placed the docu-
ment in her desk drawer because it contained an in-
accuracy concerning her educational background 
that she wanted corrected. 
Enser admitted to O'Keefe that he had given 
the document to plaintiff. O'Keefe determined that 
the personnel document was a confidential person-
nel record, that plaintiff should not have had pos-
session of the document and that both plaintiff and 
Enser had violated Northwest's policy regarding 
confidential corporate records. On May 16, 1988, 
Northwest terminated plaintiff under SOP No. 
12.3006(3)(m) for damaging the integrity or com-
promising the confidentiality of corporate informa-
tion. Enser also was terminated. 
*2 Following plaintiffs termination, Northwest 
informed Utah Job Services that plaintiff had been 
terminated for breach of confidentiality, and there-
fore should be denied unemployment compensa-
tion. Non-supervisory Northwest employees also 
were informed that plaintiff had been terminated for 
breach of corporate confidentiality. 
During her employment with Northwest, 
plaintiff applied for five positions other than the 
one she held and was not hired for any of them. 
Plaintiff claims that Northwest hired two younger, 
white American-born females and three younger, 
white American-born males for these positions. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admis-
sions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, 
show that there is no genuine issue as to any mater-
ial fact, and that the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c). 
In applying this standard, the court must construe 
all facts and reasonable inferences therefrom in the 
light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Mat-
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sushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 
U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Wright v. Southwestern Bell 
Tel. Co., 925 F.2d 1288, 1292 (10th Cir.1991). 
Once the moving party has carried its burden, 
Rule 56(e)"requires the nonmoving party to go bey-
ond the pleadings and by ... affidavits, or by the 
'depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admis-
sions on file,' designate 'specific facts showing that 
there is a genuine issue for trial.' " Celotex Corp. v 
Catrett, All U.S. 317, 324 (1986); Gonzales v. 
Millers Casualty Ins. Co., 923 F.2d 1417, 1419 
(10th Cir.l991).FN1 The non-moving party must 
"make a showing sufficient to establish the exist-
ence of an element essential to that party's case, and 
on which that party will bear the burden of proof at 
trial." Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 110 S.Ct. 
3177, 3186 (1990) (quoting Celotex Corp., 477 
U.S. at 322). 
In considering whether there exists a genuine 
issue of material fact, the court does not weigh the 
evidence but instead inquires whether a reasonable 
jury, faced with the evidence presented, could re-
turn a verdict for the nonmoving party. See Ander-
son v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 411 U.S. 242, 249 
(1986); Clifton v. Craig, 924 F.2d 182, 183 (10th 
Cir.l991).FN2 Finally, all material facts asserted 
by the moving party shall be deemed admitted un-
less specifically controverted by the opposing 
party. U.S.Ct.D.Utah Civ.R.P. 5(e). 
DISCUSSION 
Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint asserts 
seven causes of action: (1) discriminatory treatment 
on the basis of plaintiffs gender, race and national 
origin in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 
2000e-2000e-17; (2) discriminatory treatment and 
discharge on the basis of plaintiffs age in violation 
of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 626(b); (3) breach of em-
ployment contract; (4) breach of an implied coven-
ant of good faith and fair dealing; (5) defamation 
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against defendants Northwest, Reid and O Keefe 
(6) defamation against defendant McPheeters and 
(7) intentional interference with contractual rela-
tions against defendant McPheeters 
*3 Defendants have moved for summary judg-
ment on all claims Plaintiff has moved for partial 
summary judgment as to the liability issues on her 
Title VII, ADEA, breach of contract and defama-
tion claims The court considers each claim m turn 
A Title VII and ADEA Claims 
In McDonnell Douglas Corp v Green 411 
U S 792 (1973), the United States Supreme Court 
defined the elements and burdens of proof neces-
sary to establish a prima facie case under Title VII 
Plaintiff must establish that she was (1) a member 
of a protected class, (2) adversely affected by de-
fendant's employment decision, (3) qualified for the 
position, and (4) replaced or rejected in favor of a 
person not in a protected class McDonnell Douglas 
Corp 411 U S at 802 
Once plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, 
the burden of production shifts to the employer to 
articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for 
the employee's rejection Id After the employer 
presents a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason, the 
plaintiff must demonstrate that the reason offered is 
in fact a mere pretext for impermissible discrimina-
tion Id at 804 
Cases brought under ADEA are subject to the 
same requirements ot proof as Title VII cases al-
leging discriminatory treatment Branson v Price 
River Coal Co 853 F 2d 768, 770 (10th Cir 1988) 
Employers defending a Title VII or ADEA 
claim can establish a basis for summary judgment 
two ways First, the defendant can demonstrate that 
the plaintiff will be unable to establish a prima 
facie case at trial How croft v Mountain States Tel 
and Tel Co 712 F Supp 1514, 1520 (D Utah 
1989) Alternatively the defendant can demonstrate 
that the plaintiff cannot carry the ultimate burden of 
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proving intentional discrimination assuming 
plaintiff has established a prima facie case and de 
fendant has presented a legitimate, nondiscriminat-
ory reason Howcroft 712 F Supp at 1520 
Defendant Northwest contends that even as-
suming plaintiff has established a prima facie case 
of discriminatory treatment and discharge, she can-
not carry the ultimate burden of proving intentional 
discrimination On that ground alone, Northwest ar 
gues, it is entitled to summary judgment The court 
disagrees With respect to plaintiffs theoiy of dis 
criminatory discharge plaintiff has presented evid 
ence that a few years prior to plaintiffs teimination 
a younger, white, native-born male who violated 
company confidentiality policies was not teimin 
ated Plaintiff also has presented evidence that she 
was equally or better qualified than the persons se-
lected for the other positions for which she applied 
and was rejected 
In the court's opinion, this evidence is suffi-
cient to raise a factual question about whether 
Northwest's reasons for failing to promote and for 
discharging plaintiff were pretextual or legitimate 
Accordingly, neither defendant Northwest nor 
plaintiff are entitled to summary judgment on the 
Title VII and ADEA claims 
B Breach of Employment Contract 
*4 Plaintiff claims the SOP Manual created an 
express or implied contract that plaintiff be termin-
ated only for cause The presumption under Utah 
law is that any employment contract that contains 
no specified term of duration is terminable at the 
will of either party See Berube v Fashion Centei 
Ltd 111 P2d 1033 1044 (Utah 1989) This pic 
sumption may be rebutted by evidence that certain 
terms in an employee policy manual were implied 
terms of the contract of employment and limited the 
employer's right to discharge Berube 111 P 2d at 
1044 
Smce this case was argued and submitted, the 
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Utah Supreme Court has elaborated on the Berube 
implied employment contract theory in the case of 
Brehany v. Nordstrom, Inc., No. 20590 (Utah May 
16, 1991)(1991 Westlaw 80706). In Brehany, the 
Utah Supreme Court set forth two propositions that 
must be established by employees who claim their 
at-will status was altered by language in employ-
ment manuals. First, the employee must show that 
the provisions in the manual limit or modify the 
employer's unfettered right to discharge its employ-
ees. Brehany, slip op. at 9. Once this burden is car-
ried, the employee then must demonstrate that the 
employer violated the terms of the manual. Id. 
If the terms of the employment manual do pur-
port to limit the employer's power to discharge, the 
question of whether thev become implied terms of 
the employment contract is primarily a factual is-
sue. Id. The proper construction of contractual 
terms in the first instance, however, is an issue of 
law to be decided by the court, unless the contract 
terms are ambiguous and raise factual issues. Id. 
"Thus, when it is plain that a manual or bulletin 
does not limit the right to discharge at will, the case 
need not go to a jury." Id. 
Applying the law of Berube and Brehany to 
this case, the court concludes that the SOP Manual 
plainly did not limit Northwest's right to discharge 
at will, and thus defendant was free to discharge 
plaintiff for any nondiscriminatory reason. The 
SOP Manual expressly states that "[i]t should not 
be inferred from this policy that an employee can 
only be discharged for committing violations on 
this list, nor should this policy be construed to alter 
the Company's rights as an employer at will" SOP 
Manual No. 12.3006(3)(m) at 1 (emphasis added). 
Plaintiff has failed to carry her initial burden of 
demonstrating that the SOP Manual somehow lim-
ited or modified Northwest's right to discharge her. 
Northwest therefore is entitled to summary judg-
ment on plaintiffs breach of employment contract 
claim. 
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C. Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and 
Fair Dealing 
Plaintiffs claim that defendant breached a duty 
of good faith and fair dealing in discharging her 
fails as a matter of law. Without comment, the Utah 
Supreme Court refused to recognize such a claim in 
Caldwell v. Ford, Bacon & Davis of Utah, Inc., Ill 
P.2d 483, 485 (Utah 1989). In Brehany v Nord-
strom, Inc, No. 20590 (Utah May 16, 1991), the 
court again rejected this legal theory and this time 
cleared up any confusion that may have surrounded 
the implied covenant of good faith in the employ-
ment contract context. Id., slip op. at 7-9. 
*5 The Brehany court explained that the pur-
pose and function of the covenant of good faith im-
plied in all contracts differs from the purpose and 
function of the so-called covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing in employment contracts. The former 
covenant presumes that the parties intended the 
rights and duties created by the contract to be per-
formed and exercised in good faith. Brehany, slip 
op. at 8. The latter covenant, on the other hand, acts 
as a substantive limitation on the employer's right 
to discharge. Id. 
The Brehany court stated that "in the absence 
of express terms limiting the right of an employer 
to discharge for any or no reason and in the absence 
of provisions establishing procedures by which a 
discharge should be effectuated, it would be incon-
sistent to hold that an employer, on the basis of the 
implied covenant of good faith, is bound to a sub-
stantive limitation on the employer's right to dis-
charge." Id. 
Northwest, therefore, is entitled to summary 
judgment on plaintiffs claim for breach of implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
D. Defamation 
Plaintiff claims that defendants Northwest, Re-
id and O'Keefe defamed plaintiff by informing Utah 
Job Services and various Northwest employees that 
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plaintiff was terminated for violating the confiden-
tiality of company records Plaintiff further claims 
that defendant McPheeters defamed plaintiff by in-
forming Northwest management that McPheeters 
discovered the personnel document on rather than 
in plaintiffs desk and by informing Northwest em-
ployees that plaintiff was terminated for breaching 
the company confidentiality policy 
The alleged defamatory statement communic-
ated by McPheeters to the Northwest managers re-
lated solely to the location of the personnel docu-
ment If, as plaintiff alleges, the location of the doc-
ument was the only untruth, the court finds as a 
matter of law that the statement could not be de-
famatory Whether the document was on or in the 
desk is not determinative Possession, not location, 
of the document is the critical fact for purposes of 
determining defamatory content, and plaintiff does 
not dispute such possession 
With respect to McPheeters' statements to 
Northwest employees, the court finds that such 
communications were truthful or privileged Simil-
arly, the court finds that even if the statements of 
defendants Reid and O'Keefe were defamatory per 
se, such statements also were truthful or privileged, 
and thus are not actionable 
A communication between an employer and an 
employee is protected by the common interest qual-
ified privilege when (1) the statement refers to a 
matter in which the speaker has an interest or duty, 
(2) the recipient had a corresponding duty, and (3) 
the communication was made pursuant to that duty 
Lind v Lynch 665 P 2d 1276, 1278 (Utah 1983), 
Sowell v ML Freight Inc 30 Utah 2d 446, 519 
P 2d 884, 885 (1974), Alford v Utah League of Cit-
ies and Towns 791 P 2d 201, 204 (Utah App 1990) 
*6 It is undisputed that any allegedly defamat-
ory statements made by Reid or O'Keefe were com-
municated pursuant to the company investigation of 
the circumstances surrounding plaintiffs possession 
of the personnel document The recipients of the in-
formation, selected Northwest employees and Job 
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Service, had a corresponding interest in hearing the 
information Similarly, McPheeters statements to 
co-workers were privileged as statements between 
members of a group with a common interest Be 
cause there is no evidence that defendants abused 
the common interest qualified privilege, the state-
ments by Reid, O'Keefe and McPheeters are not ac-
tionable 
Accordingly, defendants are entitled to sum-
mary judgment on plaintiffs defamation claims 
against them 
E Intentional Interference with Contractual Rela 
tions 
Plaintiffs final claim is that McPheeters in 
terfered with her employment relationship with 
Northwest by searching plaintiffs desk and inform-
ing Northwest that she discovered the personnel 
document for the wrongful purpose of having 
plaintiff disciplined or terminated 
Tortious interference with contractual relations 
however, requires three actors two contracting 
parties and a third interfering party Leigh Fin 
niture and Carpet Co v Isom 657 P 2d 293 301 
(Utah 1982) There is no third party when the al 
leged interferer is an agent of the employer acting 
within the scope of her employment Fletchei v 
Wesley Medical Center 585 F Supp 1260, 1262 63 
(DKan 1984) 
Because the undisputed facts demonstrate that 
McPheeters' allegedly interfering acts were within 
the scope of her employment, such acts are attribut-
able to Northwest Thus, plaintiffs claim fails as a 
matter of law and McPheeters is entitled to sum-
mary judgment 
Accordingly, based on the foregoing, and good 
cause appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that 
1 Defendants' motion for summary judgment is 
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granted as to all claims except plaintiffs claims 
against defendant Northwest under Title VII and 
ADEA 
2 Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment is 
denied. 
3 This order shall suffice as the court's ruling 
on this motion and no further order need be pre-
pared by counsel 
FN1 The summary judgment motion may 
be "opposed by any of the kinds of eviden-
tiary materials listed in Rule 56(c), except 
the mere pleadings themselves" Celotex 
Corp v Catrett, 477 U S 317, 324 (1986) 
FN2 "The mere existence of a scintilla of 
evidence in support of the [nonmoving 
party's] position will be insufficient" An-
derson v Liberty Lobby, Inc Ml U S 
242,252(1986) 
D Utah, 1991 
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